Deconstructing Juryless Fact-Finding in Civil Cases by Sanders, Shaakirrah R.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 25 | Issue 1 Article 6
Deconstructing Juryless Fact-Finding in Civil
Cases
Shaakirrah R. Sanders
Copyright c 2016 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation






In many states, legislatures have mandated juryless fact-finding in common law–
based civil cases by imposing compensatory damage caps that effectively lessen the
jury’s traditional and historic role as injury valuator. The primary purpose of most caps
was to reign in “excessive” civil jury verdicts, which allegedly caused “skyrocketing”
medical malpractice insurance premiums and litigation costs. But no legislatively
imposed cap is triggered by a preliminary finding of excessiveness. Trial judges have
no authority to determine whether application of a cap is just or fair to the (often)
severely injured plaintiff. Despite a shared interpretive methodology with regards to
the nature and scope of civil jury trial rights, states sharply disagree on the constitu-
tionality of caps. This split does not lie in any textual interpretation of the type of civil
jury trial right provided in state constitutions, for disagreement exists even among
states with identical clauses.
This Article explores juryless fact-finding in civil cases by turning to Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence on mandatory criminal sentencing guidelines. At first
blush, compensatory damage caps appear to have little in common with criminal
sentencing. Caps reduce a jury’s damage findings to a fixed amount. Sentencing
guidelines designated which facts were necessary to support a particular sentence.
Yet, both remove the jury or ignore the jury’s factual findings during a significant
part of a civil case: the civil jury is removed or ignored during the “damages” phase
of a case and the criminal jury is removed or ignored during the “punishment” phase
of a case. Thus certain caps and certain mandatory guidelines sentencing schemes
lessened the jury’s role as fact-finder and intruded on the jury’s verdict or decree.
This Article explores both as parallel mandates of juryless fact-finding in civil and
criminal cases.
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has recently rejected mandatory juryless fact-
finding for purposes of fixing punishment in criminal cases. Mandatory guidelines
that required either reconsideration of a jury’s factual findings or consideration of new
facts were initially allowed on the theory that legislatures had authority to designate
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certain facts in a criminal case as “elements” of the offense that required a jury. Other
facts could be designated “enhancements” to the punishment and did not require a
jury. This grant of legislative authority was short lived. The Court has recently held that
a criminal jury is required to find any fact that increases the maximum and minimum
punishment. In other words, a jury is required to make factual findings that determine
the high and low end of a criminal sentence regardless of whether a fact is labeled an
element or an enhancement. Moreover, such factual findings are enforceable in other
stages of the criminal case.
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence remains undeveloped on the issue of mandated
juryless fact-finding in civil cases, but the Sixth Amendment offers three lessons about
common law criminal juries that arguably should apply in the civil context. First,
modern procedures cannot significantly alter certain common law characteristics of
the jury trial right. Second, mandatory removal of the jury as the primary fact-finder
was not authorized in common law cases. Third, a common law jury’s factual deter-
minations were fully enforceable unless exceptional circumstances were presented.
This Article applies these lessons to compensatory damage caps. This Article urges
adoption of cap alternatives that encourage individual review upon necessity. Such
alternatives should also advance a state’s dual interests to protect both civilly liable
defendants from unreasonably high awards and severely injured plaintiffs from un-
reasonably low awards.
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INTRODUCTION
This is the second work in which I discuss state laws that cap compensatory dam-
ages in certain categories of common law–based civil cases. In the first work, Uncap-
ping Compensation in the Gore Due Process Analysis,1 I argue that the punitive
1 Shaakirrah R. Sanders, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37 (2015).
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damage analysis announced in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore2 is based on a
false premise as it applied in states that have capped compensatory damages: that the
plaintiff has been fully reimbursed for actual losses.3 This Article investigates com-
pensatory damage caps in a different light—as an impermissible and ill-advised
legislative mandate of juryless fact-finding in civil cases.4
Some states have long agreed that “excessive” civil jury verdicts in personal
injury cases had caused a medical malpractice crisis of unprecedented magnitude.5
Even though many states lacked empirical support for their claims of long-lasting
and systemic excessiveness,6 a mechanic and automatic cap is applied against the
amount of recovery in certain categories of common law–based civil claims.7 States
that imposed caps most frequently did so in medical malpractice and wrongful death
lawsuits, but some caps apply to all tort cases.8 The most common type of cap ap-
plies to the non-economic-loss component of compensatory damage awards, which
includes injuries related to pain, suffering, mental anguish and other emotional dis-
tresses, disfigurement, and the loss of consortium or capacity to enjoy life.9 Other
states applied their cap more broadly to encompass the economic-loss component
of compensatory damages, which includes medical expenses, lost earnings, and
other “objectively verifiable monetary losses.”10
2 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
3 Sanders, supra note 1, at 38–39.
4 Compensatory damage caps have survived or failed challenges in state courts on the
following constitutional grounds: the civil jury trial right, equal protection, substantive due
process, separation of powers, open courts, right to an adequate remedy, access to courts, and
rules against special legislation. See infra note 160.
5 See hayleybarbour’s channel, Haley’s PAC: Tort Reform, YOUTUBE (Nov. 29, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AnfXuJ3hKlY[hereinafter Haley’s PAC]. But see Colleen
P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative Power and Jury
Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 347 (1995) (describing the impetus for statutory caps as
“runaway juries” and the need to “curb excesses”); Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and
Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1752, 1755–64, 1785 (2013) (exploring tort reform as a political controversy surrounding
civil litigation and discussing empirical work finding the effective hourly rate of contingency
fee attorneys only slightly exceeding insurance attorneys).
6 See Yeazell, supra note 5, at 1786 (arguing that compensatory damage caps hunt
“meritorious lawsuit[s] with very high damages” not frivolous lawsuits).
7 See Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil
Justice’s Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 479 (1987) (refuting tort advocates’ premises that
tort lawsuits have exploded and that civil juries in tort cases are out of control).
8 See Hensler, supra note 7, at 480 (warning against using data from one area of tort
litigation to make inferences about another area of tort litigation); Yeazell, supra note 5, at
1787 (pointing out that most U.S. civil litigation involves contracts, not torts).
9 JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 36–37 (2d ed. 2006).
10 Id. at 36. Some states have also imposed caps on punitive damage awards. See David
Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for
the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive
Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1995).
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Currently, the national tort reform debate has shifted to a discussion of whether
a medical malpractice crisis or other public harm ever existed.11 Missouri found that
its tort reform was likely to have disproportionately burdened the young, the eco-
nomically disadvantaged, and those who were most severely injured.12 These classes
of plaintiffs are unlikely to have the means to pay the upfront costs of bringing a
colorable claim for personal injury. Despite these findings, compensatory damage
caps remain the rule rather than the exception among states.
This Article does not question the existence or nonexistence of a medical mal-
practice crisis; instead, this Article questions whether compensatory damage caps
impermissibly mandate juryless fact-finding in civil cases. In those states that have
legislatively imposed compensatory damage caps, a fixed amount or limit on damages
applies regardless of the jury’s finding in an individual case.13 In cap regimes, all jury
awards over the cap are automatically deemed excessive and all awards under the cap
are presumed reasonable.14 For the most part, caps have been upheld under various pro-
visions of state constitutions.15 In states where caps were stricken, the most common
justification was encroachment on the state civil jury trial guarantee.16 To be clear, state
supreme courts are split on this issue17 and not all states have considered the question.18
11 THE CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 108TH CONG., THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE
FROM THE STATES, 12–13, 18 (2004).
12 Id. at 4; Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1122–23 (arguing that caps lack a moral justifi-
cation due to their arbitrariness and the lack of a relationship between caps and “the level of
compensable harm,” and hypothesizing that caps reduce insurance premiums by shifting “the
costs of accidents from defendants to injured plaintiffs”).
13 See Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1121–22 (discussing how caps apply regardless of
the specific facts of the case).
14 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 392–93 (discussing the operation of statutory caps).
15 See David F. Maron, Statutory Damages Caps: Analysis of the Scope of Right to Jury
Trial and the Constitutionality of Mississippi Statutory Caps on Noneconomic Damages, 32
MISS. C. L. REV. 109, 110 (2013).
16 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 380 n.152. States where compensatory damage caps in
common law based personal injury cases violate the state civil jury trial guarantee include:
Georgia, Missouri, North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington. See Maron, supra note 15, at
136–44. Alabama has ruled its cap violated the right to a trial in general. See id. at 136.
Alabama, Illinois, New Hampshire, Texas, and Wisconsin have ruled that compensatory
damage caps were unconstitutional on other grounds, including but not limited to equal pro-
tection, due process, separation of powers, open courts, right to an adequate remedy and
access to courts, and rules against special legislation. See id. at 136–44.
17 See Maron, supra note 15, at 136–44 (detailing states where compensatory damage
caps do not violate the state civil jury trial guarantee, including Alaska, California, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico,
South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia; and detailing states where compensatory
damage caps in common law based personal injury cases do not violate other provisions of the
state constitution, which include California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia).
18 See id. States where compensatory damage caps have not been litigated include
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Even among states with identical civil jury trial clauses, an analysis of state
supreme court jurisprudence leads to a stalemate on the question of whether caps
impermissibly mandate juryless fact-finding in civil cases.19 Essentially, states
splinter on two issues: first, whether caps exceed legislative authority by improperly
diminishing or removing the jury from the fact-finding process on the question of
damages; and second, whether the jury’s assessment of responsibility for an injury
(or damage award) is entitled to full enforcement. Few states disagree that the
English common law forms the interpretive basis of state (and federal) civil jury trial
rights. It is also clear that compensatory damage caps in personal injury cases
neither existed nor were contemplated by the common law at the time that most state
constitutions were enacted.20 In the common law the civil jury determined the
amount of damages and that determination was fully enforceable except in rare
cases.21 Yet, some state supreme courts have reasoned that legislative authority
always existed to alter common law rights, including the right to a civil jury.22
This Article explores juryless fact-finding in civil cases by turning to the Sixth
Amendment, which has recently addressed juryless fact-finding in mandatory criminal
sentencing guidelines schemes. Much like damage caps in common law–based civil
cases, mandatory guidelines altered the jury trial right in two ways: one, by mandat-
ing reconsideration of factual findings that had already been decided by a jury, or
two, by mandating juryless consideration of facts that are material to punishment.
Sixth Amendment Criminal Jury Trial Clause jurisprudence initially approved of
such procedures and established that legislatures had authority to designate certain
facts in a criminal case as “elements” of the offense and other facts as enhancements
to the punishment.23 This distinction proved significant. The reasonable doubt
standard applied to elements, which required a jury.24 The preponderance of the evi-
dence standard applied to enhancements, which did not.25 The Sixth Amendment’s
grant of such broad legislative authority has recently been reconsidered. Currently,
where guidelines are mandatory, a criminal jury is required to find any fact that in-
creases the maximum and minimum punishment.26 Put another way, a jury is required
to make factual findings that determine the high and low end of criminal punishment
regardless of whether a fact is designated an “element” or an “enhancement.”
Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, and North and
South Carolina. Id.
19 See Sanders, supra note 1, at 89.
20 See, e.g., Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 639–43 (Mo. 2012).
21 See id. at 639, 643.
22 See id. at 652 (Russell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 82–85 (1986).
24 Id. at 85.
25 Id. at 81.
26 See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 486–97 (2000).
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The Court’s recognition and expansion of the right to a criminal jury at sentencing
signals a return to common law–based principles with regards to the nature and scope
of jury trial rights. As a result, this jurisprudence should prove helpful for examining
whether compensatory damage caps impermissibly alter the right to a civil jury. At
first blush, compensatory damage caps and criminal sentencing guidelines appear
to have little in common. But upon closer inspection, damage caps and mandatory
sentencing guidelines operate quite similarly. Caps reduce damages to a fixed
amount that applies in all cases regardless of the jury’s findings about the individual
facts and circumstances.27 Mandatory guidelines sentencing allowed reconsideration
of the jury’s determination of the facts that supported a particular sentence.28 Both
significantly altered the jury trial right by distinguishing when a jury was required
and when a jury was not required: compensatory damage caps remove the jury from
the “damages” phase of civil litigation and mandatory sentencing guidelines re-
moved the jury from the “punishment” phase of the criminal prosecution. Both also
lessened the jury’s role as the finder of fact and allowed intrusion on the jury’s
verdict or decree.
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence provides several lessons about the intersec-
tionality between legislative authority and jury trial rights. One, modern procedures
cannot significantly alter certain common law characteristics of the jury trial right.
Two, mandatory removal of the jury as the primary fact-finder was not authorized
in common law cases. Finally, a common law jury’s factual determinations were
fully enforceable unless exceptional circumstances were presented. Based on these
lessons, this Article concludes that compensatory damage caps constitute an ill-
advised and impermissible mandate of juryless fact-finding in civil cases.
This Article urges state legislatures and supreme courts to heed the lessons of the
Sixth Amendment when considering the propriety of imposing a compensatory damage
cap. Part I of this Article examines state legislation that fixes or otherwise caps compen-
satory damage awards. Part I also examines the state supreme court split on whether
compensatory damage caps intrude on the right to a civil jury. Part I demonstrates that
compensatory damage caps reveal a fundamental disagreement among states about the
nature and scope of civil jury trial rights and legislative authority to alter that right.
Part II of this Article analogizes a similar tension that existed in Sixth Amendment
Criminal Jury Trial Clause jurisprudence. Part II examines recent Sixth Amendment
decisions limiting legislative authority to mandate juryless fact-finding at criminal
sentencing. Part II argues that these decisions signal the outer limit of authority to di-
minish jury trial rights. Part III applies the lessons from Sixth Amendment mandatory
guidelines sentencing jurisprudence to compensatory damage caps. Part III recom-
mends adoption of cap alternatives that comport with common law principles. Such
27 See Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1121–22.
28 See id. at 1123–24 (discussing similarities between punitive damages and sentencing
guidelines).
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alternatives should also advance the states’ dual interests to protect both civilly liable
defendants and severely injured plaintiffs from unreasonably high and low civil
damage awards.
I. MANDATORY JURYLESS FACT-FINDING IN CIVIL CASES
Mandatory “juryless fact-finding” exists where state legislatures have imposed
automatic and fixed caps on compensatory damages awards in certain categories of
common law–based civil cases, particularly those arising in tort. As used in this part,
the term “juryless fact-finding” refers to state laws that have removed the jury from
the “damages” phase of civil litigation or state laws that automatically lessened the
amount of compensation the jury has awarded. States that have imposed juryless
fact-finding in common law–based civil cases do so on the rationale that “excessive”
civil jury verdicts have caused a nationwide medical malpractice insurance crisis.29
This Article questions whether mandated juryless fact-finding in civil cases impermis-
sibly diminishes the jury’s constitutional role or unconstitutionally intrudes on the
jury’s verdict or decree.
Professor Stephen Yeazell, a prominent contemporary teacher and scholar on civil
procedure, has described the underpinnings of compensatory damage caps—exces-
sive civil jury verdicts—as “political theater.”30 Yeazell argues the real aim of state
law tort reforms was meritorious lawsuits with “very high damages,” not the prevention
of frivolous lawsuits.31 Yeazell appears to have a point. Some state law compensa-
tory damage caps apply broadly to all tort actions32 and others narrowly to only
29 See generally Haley’s PAC, supra note 5. But see James L. Wright & M. Matthews
Williams, Remember the Alamo: The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution,
the Doctrine of Incorporation, and State Caps on Jury Awards, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 449, 461
(2004) (arguing that the annual amount of medical malpractice payouts remained relatively
flat from 1993 to 2002 based on findings by Standard & Poor’s and the federal national
Practitioners Data Bank). In 2003, the United States General Accounting Office posited that
the failure of insurance companies to increase rates during periods of high investment return
partially caused an increase in medical malpractice premium rates. Id. at 463–64; see also
Hensler, supra note 7, at 481–82, 484 (arguing that based on data from the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, the National Center for State Courts, and Institute for Civil Justice,
“the total tort caseload has grown very little” in the years before 1987).
30 Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 87, 111–17 (1990) (discussing the civil jury role in tort litigation).
31 See Yeazell, supra note 5, at 1786 (noting that over ninety percent of civil judgments
amount to less than $1 million).
32 See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2016) ($250,000 fixed non-economic
damage cap); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.1 (1995) ($500,000 fixed non-economic damage
cap), invalidated by Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-19a02 (2014) (non-economic damage cap range from $250,000 to $350,000); OKLA.
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wrongful death cases.33 The most common type of cap applies in medical malpractice
cases.34 But a majority of states only applied the cap against non-economic damages
such as pain and suffering.35 A minority of states apply the cap against total compen-
sation, which includes both economic and non-economic damages.36 Alaska, Idaho,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee refuse to apply the cap
where injurious acts are reckless, intentional, or illegal.37 Only Massachusetts allows
the jury to ignore the cap if the failure to do so would be unfair to the plaintiff.38 A
STAT. tit. 23, § 61.2 (2016) ($350,000 fixed non-economic damage cap); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-39-102 (2015) (non-economic damage cap range between $750,000 and $1 million).
33 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (2016) ($500,000 fixed cap).
34 Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages
Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 396 (2005).
35 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.549 (2015) (cap range between $250,000 and $400,000);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2016) ($250,000 fixed cap); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302
(2015) ($1 million fixed cap against past and future damages; imposing fixed $250,000 non-
economic damage cap, which was raised to $300,000 in 2003); FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2015)
($150,000 to $1.5 million cap range in cases resulting in injury and death), invalidated in part
by Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1
(2015) ($350,000 fixed cap; cap raised to $700,000 when multiple institutions involved),
invalidated in part by Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga.
2010); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09 (West 2016) ($650,000 fixed cap except
where injury or death results); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West 2016) ($500,000
fixed cap unless the jury finds the cap would “deprive the plaintiff of just compensation”);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West 2016) ($280,000 to $500,000 cap range); MO. REV.
STAT. § 538.210 (2015) ($400,000 to $700,000 cap range) (previous $350,000 cap invali-
dated by Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012)); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 25-9-411 (2015) ($250,000 fixed cap); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (2016) ($500,000
to $2,250,000 cap range); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2015) ($350,000 fixed cap); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.19 (West 2016) ($500,000 fixed cap); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-
02 (2016) ($500,000 fixed cap); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West 2016) (cap range
between $250,000 and $1 million); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220 (2015) ($350,000 fixed
cap); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (West 2016) ($250,000 fixed cap; cap
raised to $500,000 when multiple institutions involved); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-410
(West 2016) ($250,000 to $450,000 cap range); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2015) ($250,000
to $500,000 cap range); WIS. STAT. § 893.55(4)(d)(1) (2016) ($750,000 fixed cap).
36 See generally IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (2015) (cap range between $500,000 and
$1,250,000; health care provider liable for $250,000 and remainder paid from compensation
fund); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1231.2 (2016) ($500,000 fixed cap; health care provider liable for
$100,000 and remainder paid from compensation fund); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (West
2016) ($600,000 fixed cap when injury or death results; health care provider liable for $200,000
and remainder paid from compensation fund); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (2016) ($500,000
fixed cap); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (West 2016) (cap range up to $3 million).
37 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.549; IDAHO CODE § 6-1603; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.
19; OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 61.2; S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220; TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102.
38 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (allowing jury to consider whether cap is
just or fair).
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dozen states prohibit informing the jury about the cap.39 Thirteen states do not limit
recovery in personal injury cases.40
For decades Professor Deborah Hensler has argued that jury awards in personal
injury cases have remained relatively stable.41 Additionally, Professors Neil Vidmar and
Jeffrey Rice have concluded that juries provide more stable estimates of non-economic
damages than arbitrators.42 Ironically, among states that have imposed compensatory
damage caps, what constitutes an “excessive” civil jury verdict varies widely. The
amount of fixed recovery in most cap regimes ranges between $250,000 and $3 mil-
lion.43 The majority of states fix the cap at $250,000 or $350,000.44 At $3 million,
39 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302; IDAHO CODE § 6-1603; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
19a02 (2014); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09; MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210;
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.19; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
42-02; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43; OKLA. STAT. tit. 23,
§ 61.2; TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102; see also Murphy, supra note 5, at 401–02 (arguing
against misinforming the jury about the governing law on compensation).
40 Maron, supra note 15, at 110 n.6, 136–44 (noting that thirteen states, and the District
of Columbia, have not imposed caps on tort damage awards, including Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wyoming).
41 See Hensler, supra note 7, at 486–96 (concluding that from 1960–1979 jury awards in
personal injury cases had remained relatively stable and concluding that once one accounts
for differences in the type of case juries have properly awarded higher damages based on the
seriousness of the injury).
42 See Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Med-
ical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 884
(1993) (noting that personal injury plaintiffs prevail in only one-third to one-fifth of jury trials).
43 See infra notes 44–52 and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2016) (fixed $250,000 non-economic
damage cap in medical malpractice cases); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (fixed $250,000
non-economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases, which was raised to $300,000 in
2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2015) (fixed $350,000 non-economic damage cap in
medical malpractice cases; cap raised to $700,000 when multiple institutions involved),
invalidated by Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (fixed $250,000 non-economic damage cap in all personal
injury cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 ($250,000 non-economic damage cap in all
personal injury cases fixed according to year); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (fixed range of
$400,000–$700,00 non-economic damage caps in medical malpractice cases) (previous
$350,000 cap invalidated in part by Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633
(Mo. 2012)); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (fixed $250,000 non-economic damage cap in
medical malpractice cases); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (2016) (non-economic damage cap
range of $500,000 to $2,250,000 in medical malpractice cases); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035
(2015) (fixed $350,000 cap); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (fixed $500,000 non-economic
damage cap in medical malpractice cases); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 61.2 (fixed $350,000 non-
economic damage cap in all cases involving bodily injury); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220
(2015) (fixed $350,000 non-economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (2016) (fixed $250,000 non-economic damage cap in
medical malpractice cases; cap raised to $500,000 when multiple institutions involved); WIS.
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Virginia’s fixed cap is the highest, but it was also previously fixed at $750,000.45 No
other fixed cap is set higher than $650,000.46 Washington’s cap designated a formula
based on the plaintiff’s age.47 Nine states also designated a range for their cap,48 but
of those only Indiana and South Carolina allow damages above $1 million.49 The
highest cap range under $2 million is Tennessee at $750,000 to $1 million.50 The
broadest cap range was Florida at $150,000 to 1.5 million.51 Colorado, Idaho, Illinois,
Maryland, Michigan, North and South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, and Wiscon-
sin provide annual increases to the cap.52 Other states do not.
STAT. § 893.55(4)(d)(1) (2014) (fixed $750,000 non-economic damage cap in medical mal-
practice cases).
45 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2016).
46 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.1 (1995) (fixed $500,000 non-economic damage cap
in all personal injury cases), invalidated by Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057
(Ill. 1997); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1231.2 (2016) (total damage cap of $500,000 in medical
malpractice cases); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (2016) (fixed $500,000 cap in
wrongful death cases); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09 (West 2016) (fixed
non-economic damage cap of $650,000 in medical malpractice cases where injury or death
results); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (2016) (fixed $500,000 non-economic
damage cap in medical malpractice cases unless the jury finds the cap would “deprive the
plaintiff of just compensation”) (emphasis added); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.19 (West
2016) (fixed $500,000 non-economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-5-6 (West 2016) (fixed $600,000 non-economic damage cap medical malpractice
cases when injury or death results); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (2016) (fixed $500,000
total damage cap in medical malpractice cases).
47 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 (2016) (imposing cap in all personal injury cases),
invalidated by Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
48 See generally ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.549 (2015) (non-economic damage cap between
$250,000 and $400,000 in medical malpractice cases); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 ($1
million cap against past and future damages); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West
2016) ($280,000 to $500,000 non-economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West 2016) (non-economic damage cap range between
$250,000 and $1 million in medical malpractice cases); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-410
(West 2016) (non-economic damage cap range between $250,000 to $450,000 in medical
malpractice cases); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2015) (non-economic damage cap range
between $250,000 to $500,000 in medical malpractice cases).
49 See IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (2015) (non-economic damage cap range between
$500,000 and $1,125,000 in personal injury cases); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220 (fixed cap
range between $350,000 to $1,050,000 in medical malpractice cases).
50 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (2015).
51 FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2015) (imposing cap against non-economic damages in medical
malpractice cases resulting in personal injury or death), invalidated in part by Estate of
McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014) (plurality opinion).
52 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2015); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 51/2-1115.1 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09 (West
2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.19 (West
2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-410; W. VA. CODE § 55-
7B-8; WIS. STAT. § 893.55(4)(d)(1) (2014).
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Whether compensatory damage caps impermissibly mandate juryless fact-
finding and infringe on state civil jury rights has been the subject of much state
constitutional jurisprudence. Yeazell describes the civil jury as a unique U.S. insti-
tution,53 albeit one adopted from the common law. With the exceptions of Colorado
and Louisiana, all U.S. state constitutions, as well as the federal constitution, guarantee
a civil jury in common law cases.54 Despite differences in terminology, most state
civil jury trial clauses appear to guarantee the same thing. Thirty-two state constitu-
tions establish an inviolate civil jury trial right.55 “Inviolate” is defined as “free from
change or blemish: pure [or] unbroken.”56 Civil jury trial clauses in Alaska, Hawaii,
Michigan, and West Virginia mirror57 the Seventh Amendment, which provides:
“[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”58 The term “preserve” is defined
as “to maintain unchanged” or “to keep or maintain intact.”59 Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia declare a sacred civil jury trial right.60 In this
53 See Yeazell, supra note 5, at 1783 (arguing that “[a]ccording to most historical
accounts” the U.S. civil jury is a unique institution that reflects distrust of judges and lawyers
(citing Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 667–705 (1973))).
54 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also infra notes 55, 57, 60, 62, and accompanying
text. But see Motz v. Jammaron, 676 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Colo. App. 1983) (acknowledging
that under the Colorado Constitution there is no right to a civil jury); Tellis v. Lincoln Par.
Police Jury (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/14/05); 916 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (acknowledging that the
Louisiana Constitution does not include a right to a civil jury).
55 See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 23; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 7; CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 19; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; GA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 1, para. XI; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 13; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 20;
KAN. BILL OF RIGHTS § 5; KY. CONST. art. 1, § 7; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 4; MISS. CONST.
art. 3, § 31; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 22(a); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 26; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 6;
NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 3; N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 9; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 12; N.Y. CONST.
art. 1, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 19; OR.
CONST. art. 1, § 17; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 15; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 14;
S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 6; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 15; UTAH CONST. art. 1,
§ 10; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 21; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 5. But see COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 23
(only referring to criminal cases); WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (guaranteeing an inviolate right
to a criminal jury).
56 Inviolate, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1190 (2002).
57 See ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 16; HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 13; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 14;
W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 13.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,
432–33 (1996) (discussing the Seventh Amendment’s Civil Jury Trial and Reexamination
Clauses).
59 Preserve, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1102 (4th ed. 2007).
60 See MASS. CONST. art. XV, pt. 1; N.H. CONST. art. 20; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 12; VA.
CONST. art. 1, § 11.
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sense, “sacred” is best defined as “reverence from violation, interference, incursion,
etc., sacrosanct, inviolable.”61 Civil jury trial clauses in Delaware, Maine, Maryland,
and North and South Carolina can be best described as anomalies, but they contain
some combination of the terms “inviolate,” “preserved,” or “sacred.”62
“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies
so firm a place in . . . history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the
right . . . [is] scrutinized [under the federal constitution] with the utmost care.”63 It is
unclear whether this rule applies to state civil jury trial clauses. But for state constitu-
tions that have expressly adopted the common law, a change that alters the common law
may also alter the state constitution.64 Nevertheless, Justice Harlan Stone recognized
long ago that the common law was flexible, was adaptable to varying conditions, and
did not prevent development of novel procedures.65 Unless, warned Stone, such pro-
cedures impaired the jury’s function to decide issues of fact.66 As noted by Professor
Suja Thomas, who has thoroughly chronicled civil jury practices in the U.S. colonial
era, even under an evolving standard “the substance of the right to a jury trial must
be maintained such that at minimum the jury is the fact-finder as it existed at
English common law.”67
Professors David Baldus, John MacQueen, and George Woodworth argue that
compensatory damage caps constitute legislative interference on the domain of jury
decision making.68 Nevertheless, state supreme courts are currently split as to
whether legislative authority exists to remove the jury or lessen the jury’s role as the
primary fact-finder on the issue of damages. Specifically, states disagree whether
61 Sacred, 2 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2644 (6th ed. 2007).
62 See DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (“Trial by jury shall be as heretofore.”); MD. DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS art. 23 (inviolably preserving civil jury trial right); ME. CONST. art. 1, § 20 (“In
all civil suits, and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to
a trial by jury, except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced[.]”); N.C.
CONST. art. 1, § 25 (preserving civil jury trial right as sacred and inviolable); S.C. CONST.
art. 1, § 14 (“The right of trial by jury shall be preserved inviolate.”). But see LA. CONST. art.
1, § 16 (only guaranteeing the right to a criminal jury trial).
63 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
64 See id. at 487; see also id. at 490–91 (Stone, J., dissenting). But see Wolfram, supra
note 53, at 732 (observing that the freedom enjoyed by the “original states” only applied to
their own system of civil trials and arguing against “imposing any particular division of
judge-jury functions upon the subsequently admitted states”).
65 See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 492 (Stone, J., dissenting) (maintaining that any encroach-
ments on the jury trial right that were impermissible in the common law would also be imper-
missible by the Seventh Amendment).
66 See id.
67 Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 789 (2003).
68 See Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1169–70 (pointing out the difficulty of identifying
any upper and lower dollar limits that would be reasonable).
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compensatory damage caps violated their inviolate, preserved, or sacred civil jury
trial guarantee by impermissibly interfering with the jury’s damage determination.
This split does not lie in any textual interpretation of the meaning of the type of any
civil jury trial clause. Instead, the conflict lies in the nature and scope of the civil
jury trial right as it existed in the common law at the time of ratification of the
specific state right to a civil jury. Curiously, the state supreme court split on this
issue exists even among states with identical civil jury trial clauses and among states
with close-in-time ratification of their civil jury trial right.
Professor Colleen Murphy, who has extensively written on the intersection of
legislative authority and the right to a civil jury, has warned that compensatory
damage caps render the jury’s computation of damages illusory.69 Yet, the majority
of states, like Virginia in Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals,70 have ruled that
capped compensation schemes do not impermissibly alter the nature or scope of the
civil jury trial right.71 A minority of states, like Washington in Sofie v. Fibreboard
Corp.,72 disagree and have held that capped compensation infringed on the right to
a civil jury.73 Etheridge involved the reduction of a civil jury’s award of $2,750,000
pursuant to a Virginia law that at the time capped total damages in medical malpractice
cases to $750,000.74 The plaintiff, Richie Wilson, was described as a “normal, and
healthy” 35-year-old wife and mother of three children.75 Wilson underwent surgery
to restore her deteriorating jaw bone.76 During the surgery, long portions of her rib
bones were removed, reshaped, and grafted into her jaw.77 Wilson was left permanently
69 Murphy, supra note 5, at 404 (pointing out the disingenuousness of the argument that
compensatory damage caps do not alter the role of the jury because caps “render[ ] the jury’s
decision about compensation illusory”).
70 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
71 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
72 771 P.2d 711, 728 (Wash. 1989).
73 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Before Etheridge and Sofie, some state
supreme courts had already examined whether the application of a compensatory damage cap
in common law–based personal injury cases violated the state right to a civil jury. Compare
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 602 (Ind. 1980) ($500,000 cap in medi-
cal malpractice cases did not violate state civil jury trial clause), overruled on other grounds
by In re Stephens, 867 N.E.2d 148, 156 (Ind. 2007) (reprimanding attorney for unreasonable
contingent fees in medical malpractice case), with Wright v. Cent. DuPage Hosp. Ass’n, 347
N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976) (holding $500,000 cap against total damages violated civil jury
trial clause), and Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 138 (N.D. 1978) (holding cap violated
state civil jury trial clause).
74 Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 527–28; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (1989).
75 Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 526.
76 Id.
77 Id. After a general surgeon, Dr. Trower, removed Wilson’s rib bones, an oral surgeon
grafted the reshaped bone into Wilson’s jaw. Id. The civil jury found both Dr. Trower and
the hospital negligent and found that their negligence caused Wilson’s injuries. Id.
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brain damaged, paralyzed, and confined to a wheelchair.78 As a result, she was
unable to care for herself or for her children.79
Etheridge declared Virginia’s legislature had broad authority to impose a capped
compensatory damage award in civil cases.80 The Etheridge court reasoned that com-
pensatory damage caps did “nothing more than establish the outer limits” of recovery.81
Etheridge reasoned legislative actions presumptively reasonable unless “plainly re-
pugnant to some provision of the state or federal constitution.”82 The Etheridge court
also accepted that a correlation existed between nationwide increases in medical
malpractice insurance premiums and the availability of medical malpractice insur-
ance in Virginia.83 In doing so, the court relied on a 1975 state commissioned study
that demonstrated that since 1960 medical malpractice insurance rates had increased
nationwide more than one thousand percent.84 According to this report, the increase
resulted from the number and severity of medical malpractice claims.85 Etheridge also
accepted the legislature’s conclusion that it had become too expensive to purchase
medical malpractice insurance in Virginia and that the availability of medical care
services within the State had become endangered.86 Finally, Etheridge afforded great
deference to the Virginia legislature’s judgment that the amount of the cap should
reflect what medical malpractice insurers were willing to cover, which at that time
was a total of $750,000 for both economic and non-economic damages.87
Professor Charles McCormick, author of the 1935 classic Handbook on the Law
of Damages, preaches that “from the beginning of trial by jury,” the amount of damages
78 Id. at 527. Wilson earned approximately $10,000 per year as a nurse before the acci-
dent. Id. Wilson’s brain damage severely affected her memory and intelligence and caused
paralysis on her left side. Id. Wilson’s medical bills had already exceeded $300,000 by the
time of trial and such expenditures were expected to last the rest of her life. Id. Wilson’s life
expectancy was 39.9 years. Id. Total alleged losses amounted to $1.9 million. Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 538.
81 Id. at 529. But see Murphy, supra note 5, at 404 (arguing that statutory caps change
the functioning of the jury).
82 Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 528 (quoting Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 269 S.E.2d 827,
832 (Va. 1980)) (resolving doubts in favor of the validity of legislative action).
83 Id at 527.
84 Id. The study was prepared by the Virginia State Corporation Commission’s Bureau of
Insurance, which reported that “since 1960 medical malpractice insurance rates had increased
nationwide more than [one thousand] percent.” Id. This increase allegedly resulted from a rise
in the number and severity of medical malpractice claims, of which ninety percent originated
after 1965. Id. Insurance rate increases allegedly caused providers to cease providing services
in Virginia, jeopardizing the health, safety, and welfare of state citizens. Id. at 527–28.
85 Id. at 527.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 527–28. The court accepted the General Assembly’s assertion that health care
providers in Virginia experienced increasing difficulties obtaining medical malpractice insur-
ance in excess of $750,000. Id. at 527. The court provided no support for this finding.
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were a “‘fact’ to be found by the jur[y].”88 Additionally, Professor John Langbein ar-
gues that in the common law, the link between trial and jury was so close that there was
“no such thing as nonjury trial” whether by legislative action or otherwise.89 The
Etheridge court appeared to disagree with McCormick and Langbein. In holding that
Virginia’s compensatory damage cap did not alter the state right to a civil jury,90
Etheridge briefly examined the scope of the civil jury trial right as it existed when
Virginia’s Constitution was adopted in 1771.91 Etheridge designated the “case stated”
procedure the best portrayal of the distinction between the jury and the court during the
latter part of the eighteenth century.92 But as described by Etheridge, the “case stated”
procedure was designed specifically for when only undisputed facts remained.93 In a
trial that resulted in a “case stated,” the jury’s role was limited to resolving any factual
issues that might arise.94 Etheridge did not discuss procedures that were used during
the late eighteenth century when a case presented disputed issues of fact.95 Instead,
Etheridge held that where a case was “stated,” the parties were entitled to a jury’s
assessment of damages, but not the legal effect or enforcement of the jury’s award.96
Professor Emeritus Dan Dobbs, a prolific scholar on the law of remedies,97 de-
scribes the aim of compensatory damage awards in personal injury cases as “com-
pensating the victim or making good the losses proximately resulting from the
injury.”98 Dobbs also includes both the economic—and non-economic—loss
88 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 24 (1935).
89 John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE
L.J. 522, 527 (2012).
90 Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529.
91 Id. at 528. The Virginia Constitution was ratified twenty years before the Federal Bill
of Rights.
92 Id. at 529. The Virginia Supreme Court identified three procedures that defined the
jury’s role: the “case stated,” the “demurrer to the evidence,” and the “special verdict.” Id.
93 Id. According to the Etheridge majority, the case stated procedure limited the jury’s
role to resolving disputed facts. Id. Because Virginia’s jury trial guarantee only applies to
disputed facts, the jury’s role was fulfilled once those facts were ascertained. Id. The law
determined the rights of the parties and the remedies available to the parties. Id.
94 Id.
95 Presumably the case stated procedure would not apply where a case involves disputed
facts. In the common law factual disputes were resolved by a jury. Langbein, supra note 89,
at 527. Langbein posits that in the common law the link between trial and jury was such that
there was “no such thing as nonjury trial.” Id. Langbein defines bench trials as “adjudication
by the judge sitting without a jury.” Id. Bench trials were unknown until the later nineteenth
century, well after enactment of Virginia’s Constitution in 1771. Id.; see also Murphy, supra
note 5, at 361 (describing the exceptions to the common law tradition of “jury-determined com-
pensation” as either a default judgment or a demurrer to certain amount in favor of the plaintiff).
96 Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529.
97 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION (2d ed. 1993).
98 Id. § 8.1(1), at 647 (discussing requirement that damages in personal injury cases be
proved and calculated at the trial).
250 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:235
components of the compensatory damage award as redress for an injured party’s
losses.99 The redress of such losses historically constituted a legal remedy for which
a jury was required.100 The jury’s assessment includes the injury itself and the extent
of harm or value of the injury.101 Both presented a question of “historical or predic-
tive fact.”102 According to Dobbs, such facts vary with “the kind of harm suf-
fered.”103 Yet, a majority of state supreme courts agree with Etheridge that the jury’s
constitutionally mandated role was fulfilled once disputed facts were resolved and
damages were assessed (even if the latter was unenforceable).104 Etheridge described
the trial court’s reduction of damages as only the mere application of the law to the
facts.105 Virginia’s cap only dictated the outer limits, or the ceiling, of a jury’s
award.106 Such procedures did not plainly infringe on Virginia’s sacred civil jury
trial right because, as the case stated procedure allegedly demonstrated, “the com-
mon law never recognized a right to a full recovery in tort.”107 Etheridge also
described the cause of action for medical malpractice as a legislatively created tort
rather than one based on the common law.108 Thus in Virginia, the jury’s fact-finding
function extended to an assessment of damages but the law could ultimately deter-
mine the limits of recovery.109 The Etheridge court clearly disagreed with Dobbs,
McCormick, and Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, all of whom described the
99 Id. § 1.1, at 3–4 (distinguishing between “damages as compensation” and “noncompen-
satory mone[tary] awards”); see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (explaining the difference between compensatory and punitive damages).
100 DOBBS, supra note 97, § 1.2, at 9 (distinguishing between remedies at law, which
required a jury, and remedies in equity, which do not require a jury); see also Murphy, supra
note 5, at 349 (characterizing the jury’s role as injury evaluator as “the heart of [its] con-
stitutional province”).
101 See Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 432; see also Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the
Civil Jury’s Role in the Structure of Our Government, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1262
(2014) (describing the U.S. civil jury determination of “the appropriate [amount of] damages”
as historically broad and discretionary).
102 Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 429 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
103 DOBBS, supra note 97, § 3.3(1), at 220 (explaining the lack of universal measurement
for damages).
104 Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989) (acknowledging that the
jury’s fact-finding function extended to the assessment of damages, but arguing that because
damages were a remedy their measurement was a matter of law not fact).
105 Id. (finding it significant that the cap is applied after the jury has fulfilled its fact-finding
function).
106 Id.
107 Id. (citations omitted) (recognizing that “the jury trial guarantee” is limited to that
which existed at common law).
108 Id.
109 Id.
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amount of compensatory damages in common law–based civil cases as an issue of
fact within the province of the jury.110
Four months after Etheridge was decided, the Washington Supreme Court appeared
to agree with Dobbs, McCormick, and Seventh Amendment jurisprudence in Sofie v.
Fibreboard Corp.111 Sofie involved a $1,345,833 damage award that was reduced to
$316,377 pursuant to a section of the Revised Code of Washington that capped non-
economic damages in personal injury and wrongful death cases using a formula based
on the plaintiff’s age.112 Austin Sofie was a 67-year-old career pipe-fitter who suffered
from mesothelioma, the cause of which was asbestos exposure.113 Damages proven at
trial included extreme pain and consuming physical agony that could be only tempo-
rarily relieved with hot baths or “morphine cocktails.”114 The Sofie trial judge found
the jury’s award reasonable, but reduced it in accordance to Washington’s cap.115 The
Washington Supreme Court ruled the cap violated Washington’s inviolate civil jury
trial right.116
While the court presumed Washington’s cap was constitutional, Sofie looked
further beyond the question of legislative authority than Etheridge.117 The court instead
focused its examination on the civil jury trial right as it existed in the common law
when Washington’s constitution was adopted in 1889.118 Like the Etheridge court,
the Sofie court determined that this historical “point in time” determined the scope of
Washington’s right to a civil jury and the causes of action to which that right applied.119
But Etheridge and Sofie diverge on whether state jury trial rights were resistant to
legislative attempts to reduce the civil jury’s role as the fact-finder on compensatory
damages.120 Murphy describes this conflict as a larger question concerning legislative
110 DOBBS, supra note 97, § 1.2, at 9; see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418–19
(1987); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
111 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
112 Id. at 712–13. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250(2) applied to “damages for personal injury
or death” and prohibited a claimant from recovering non-economic damages that exceeded
“an amount determined by multiplying 0.43 by the average annual wage and by the life
expectancy of the person incurring noneconomic damages . . . .” Id. at 713 (quoting WASH
REV. CODE § 4.56.250(2) (2016)). The jury’s economic damage award was $191,241 and the
jury’s non-economic damage award was $1,154,592. Id. Mr. Sofie received $477, 200 for




116 Id. at 712. The Sofie court declared the civil jury trial issue dispositive. Id. at 715.
117 Id. at 715 (applying a reasonableness standard because the cap was classified as eco-
nomic legislation).
118 Id. at 716 (citing State ex rel. Goodner v. Speed, 640 P.2d 13 (Wash. 1982)). Washing-
ton’s constitution was adopted over a century after Virginia’s Constitution. Id.
119 Id. at 720.
120 Compare id. (“Constitutional protections are not directly subject to common law
changes.”), with Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989) (broad legis-
lative authority exists to alter civil jury trial rights as they existed in the common law). Sofie
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prerogative and jury authority to determine damages.121 While Sofie professed to
examine the issues of legislative prerogative and jury authority separately, the court
essentially questioned whether the amount of damages was an issue of fact “within
the jury’s province.”122 Sofie held that the constitutional nature of the right to a civil
jury trial prohibited modifications by legislative action.123 In effect Washington’s
legislature had the authority to define the parameters of a cause of action and pre-
scribe factors to determine liability,124 but could not predetermine the limits of the
jury’s fact-finding power or preset damages in common law–based civil cases.125
The Sofie court also appears to align more closely with Thomas, Murphy, and
Langbein’s views on the nature and scope of the civil jury as that right existed in the
common law. Sofie held “there [was] not . . . an issue whether the right to a jury
attache[d]” because both the economic and non-economic components of a compen-
satory damage award were issues of fact.126 Despite the court’s earlier protestations
of the inapplicability of the Seventh Amendment,127 Sofie looked to interpretations
of that Amendment for guidance.128 The Sofie court found that although “‘newer’ tort
theories” were alleged, the heart of the claim was negligence or other misconduct
that resulted in personal injury.129 Those types of personal injuries were among those
the common law recognized in 1889.130
reasoned that the majority of state supreme courts that followed Etheridge failed to analyze
the jury’s historical role in the issue of damages or failed to engage in the correct “historical
constitutional analysis” to construe the right to a civil jury. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 723.
121 Murphy, supra note 5, at 348–49 (framing the issue as whether and to what extent
legislatures may “alter the norm of jury determination of compensation” and warning against
legislative “interfere[nce] with an ‘essential function’ of” the civil jury).
122 Sofie, 771 P.2d at 723–24. Because the civil jury’s finding of damages enjoyed a
presumption of validity, that finding cannot be altered unless unsupported by the evidence.
Id. at 721.
123 Id. at 716, 719 (citing Baker v. Prewitt, 19 P. 149 (1888)) (clear evidence exists “that
the jury’s fact-finding function included the determination of damages”); see also Bingaman
v. Grays Harbor Cmty. Hosp., 699 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Wash. 1985) (holding that the amount
of damages was within the province of a properly instructed jury).
124 Sofie, 771 P.2d at 727.
125 Id. at 719 (recognizing that legislative power to “shape” litigation did not extend to
altering constitutional protections and warning that caps unconstitutionally disregarded the
jury’s findings).
126 Id. at 718–19.
127 Id. at 716 (citing Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916);
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876)); see also Wright & Williams, supra note 29, at
482–94 (discussing the Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial Clause’s unincorporated status).
128 Sofie, 771 P.2d at 717–18 (discussing Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) and Tull
v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), and finding the latter case fundamentally distinguish-
able because it involved civil penalties in a regulatory enforcement case).
129 Id. at 718–19 (explaining how a basic cause of action should remain as one that arises
in tort even after it is categorized as a newer theory of recovery).
130 Id. at 718.
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Finally, the Sofie court also appeared to agree with Baldus, MacQueen, and
Woodworth, who have argued that compensatory damage caps are “completely unre-
lated to the level of compensable harm suffered by the plaintiff,”131 and that caps do not
address the equitable relationship between the injury and the award.132 Sofie reasoned
that Washington’s cap impermissibly changed the trial’s outcome from a jury’s de-
termination to a predetermined one fixed by the legislature.133 Washington’s proce-
dure reduced the civil jury trial right to a shadow without substance.134 To the extent
that other procedures allowed modification of the jury’s determination of damages,
such exercise of authority was rare and required a case-by-case review.135 In short,
Washington’s cap imposed compensatory damages that were unsupported by the
evidence, and caps constituted a legislative attempt to mandate legal conclusions.136
To rule otherwise would result in civil juries “exist[ing] in form,” but having “no
effect in function.”137
After Sofie, state supreme courts and state courts of appeal more commonly
agreed with Etheridge and ruled that compensatory damage caps did not infringe
on state civil jury trial rights.138 Of note is Idaho, whose legislature lowered its
131 See Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1122–23 (commenting that caps shift “the costs of
accidents from defendants to injured plaintiffs as a means of reducing insurance premiums”).
132 Id. at 1122 (noting how caps do not address inadequate awards).
133 Sofie, 771 P.2d at 720. Sofie described this change as a direct infringement on the civil
jury trial right. Id. at 720–21, 723.
134 Id. at 721 (internal quotations marks omitted) (describing the Washington Constitution
as one of “substance, not shadows”).
135 Id.; see also id. at 724 (comparing cap and remittitur procedures).
136 Id. at 721, 724.
137 Id. at 724.
138 See, e.g., Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002) (holding $250,000 cap against non-
economic damages in personal injury cases and $400,000 cap in wrongful death cases do not vio-
late state right to a civil jury); Stinnett v. Tam, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding $250,000 cap against non-economic damages does not violate state right to a civil jury);
Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993) (holding $500,000 to $1 million non-
economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases did not violate state right to a civil jury);
Kirkland v. Blaine Cty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000) (holding $400,000 non-economic
damage cap in personal injury cases does not violate state right to a civil jury; no litigation
on subsequently enacted $250,000 cap); Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098 (Kan. 2012) (holding
$250,000 cap against non-economic damages does not violate right to civil jury trial); Samsel
v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990) (holding $250,000 non-economic
damage cap in personal injury cases does not violate state right to a civil jury); Murphy v.
Edmunds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992) (holding $350,000 non-economic damage cap in personal
injury cases does not violate state right to a civil jury); Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721
(Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (holding $280,000 cap against non-economic damages, except in cases
where the plaintiff was left hemiplegic, paraplegic, quadriplegic, or cognitively disabled, does
not violate state right to a civil jury because state legislature had authority to modify common
law rights of actions and statutory remedies); Adams ex rel v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832
S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992) (holding $350,000 non-economic damage cap in medical malpractice
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$400,000 non-economic damage cap shortly after that cap was held constitutional
in Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center.139 The Idaho Supreme Court has
cases does not violate state right to a civil jury), overruled by Watts v. Cox Med. Ctr., 376
S.W. 3d 633 (Mo. 2012) ($350,000 cap violates state civil jury trial clause; no litigation on
subsequently enacted $400,000 to $700,000 cap range); Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb.
Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003) (holding $1.25 million cap against total
damages did not violate state right to a civil jury); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d
420 (Ohio 2007) (holding $350,000 cap did not violate state right to a civil jury); Knowles
ex rel. Knowles v. United States, 544 N.W. 2d 183 (S.D. 1996) (holding $500,000 cap against
non-economic damages, unlike cap against total damages, did not violate state right to a civil
jury); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135 (Utah 2004) (holding $250,000 non-economic damages did
not violate state right to a civil jury); Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp. Inc., 623 N.W.2d 776 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2000) (holding $350,000 non-economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases does
not violate state right to a civil jury), overruled on other grounds by Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli
v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005) (holding $350,000 cap violated state
guarantee of equal protection; no litigation on subsequently enacted $750,000 non-economic
damage cap); MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va. 2011) (holding $500,000
cap against non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases did not violate state right to a
civil jury). Compare Lakin v. Senco Prods., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999) (holding $500,000 non-
economic damages cap in personal injury cases violates state right to a civil jury), and
Klutschkowski v. PeaceHealth, 311 P.3d 461 (Or. 2013) (holding application of statutory cap
on non-economic damages violates right to civil jury trial), with Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789
(Or. 1995) (holding $500,000 non-economic damage cap in wrongful death case does not violate
state right to a civil jury), and Hughes v. Peacehealth, 178 P.3d 225 (Or. 2008) (holding statu-
tory cap on non-economic damages in wrongful death action did not violate right to civil jury
trial). But see Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010)
($350,000 non-economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases against a single medical fa-
cility violates state right to a civil jury). See generally Watson v. Hortman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 795
(E.D. Tex. 2012) (rejecting contention that non-economic damage cap imposed after state con-
stitutional amendment violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause or the right to access to
courts); Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990) (upholding non-economic damage
cap in wrongful death cases).
139 4 P.3d 1115, 1122 (Idaho 2000). Kirkland involved a claim that was originally brought in
federal district court against the defendants, a doctor and a hospital, who provided prenatal care
to plaintiffs, Sandy Kirkland, and her newborn son, Bryce. Id. at 1116. The jury awarded com-
pensation in the amount of $29.7 million, which included a non-economic damage award of
$18.5 million. Id. at 1116–17. The $400,000 non-economic damage cap contained in section
6-1603(1) of the Idaho Code was not applied to seventy-five percent of the award based on the
jury’s finding that the doctor, who was primarily liable, was reckless. Id. at 1117. Certification
was sought in federal court on several issues of state law, including whether the cap violated
the state civil jury trial right contained in article I, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution. Id. The
Kirkland court professed to interpret the scope of Idaho’s inviolate civil jury trial right as it
existed in the common law at the time the state constitution was adopted—which was in 1890
(over a century after the adoption of the Virginia Constitution but one year after the adoption
of the Washington Constitution). Id. at 1117–18. By 1871, Idaho generally recognized the right
of the jury to assess and award damages in personal injury cases. Id. at 1118. However, Idaho’s
legislature had authority to abolish or modify common law rights and remedies. Id. at 1117
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not ruled on the constitutionality of that state’s current $250,000 non-economic
damage cap.
Despite the early trend of majority state supreme court agreement with Etheridge,
Sofie was recently adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Watts v. Cox Medical
Center.140 Watts reconsidered the constitutionality of Missouri’s $350,000 cap against
non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases.141 The cap was originally upheld
in Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hospital.142 The Watts jury awarded $1.45 million in
(citing IDAHO CONST. art. XXI, § 2 (“All laws now in force in the territory of Idaho which are
not repugnant to this Constitution shall remain in force until they expire by their own limi-
tation or be altered or repealed by the legislature.”) (emphasis added)); see also Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 482–84 (1935). The
Kirkland court could “discern no logical reason why a statutory limitation on a plaintiff’s
remedy is any different than other permissible limitations on the ability of plaintiffs to recover
in tort actions.” Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1119. Idaho’s mandate of juryless fact-finding on the
issue of damages in medical malpractice cases was described as such a modification. Id.
(citing IDAHO CODE § 6-904 (referring to limitation on liability of government entities); § 6-
1101-09 (referring to limitation on ski area operators); § 72-209 (referring to workers compen-
sation laws)). Kirkland further analogized three statutes that allowed increases to a jury’s award
and reasoned that the framers of Idaho’s constitution could not have intended to prohibit all
laws modifying jury awards. Id. (citing REV. STAT. OF IDAHO TERRITORY, 1887, Title VIII,
Ch. III, § 1336 (allowing for double damages against quartz mill owner whose failure to enclose
causes another’s livestock to drink unsafe water); § 4531 (allowing for treble damages against
those who unlawfully remove another’s timber); § 4533 (allowing for damages amounting to
triple that of actual damages for an unlawful or forcible entry)). Kirkland did not distinguish
the relationship between the above-mentioned causes of action and common law tort. Id. at
1119–20. Nevertheless, Kirkland held these pre-ratification statutes demonstrative of the
Idaho legislature’s power to modify the common law. Id. With little explanation, Kirkland dis-
agreed with Sofie that a predetermined cap “plays lip service to the form of the jury.” Id. at 1120
(citing Lakin, 987 P.2d at 473 (quoting Sofie, 771 P.2d 771, 721 (Wash. 1989)) (the right to a jury
only entitles a party to a jury’s verdict, not enforcement of that verdict)). Idaho’s legislature
could predetermine the maximum value of compensatory damages regardless of the jury’s
findings of fact because Idaho did not guarantee enforcement of the jury’s determination of
the value or amount of the injury (at least in medical malpractice cases). Id. (maintaining that
“[t]he legal consequences and effect of a jury’s verdict are a matter for the legislature . . . and
the courts . . . .”).
140 376 S.W.3d 633, 640–42 (Mo. 2012).
141 Id. at 637.
142 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). Adams held that the amount of damages was
a question of law, not fact, and thus not within the jury’s purview. Id. at 907. Relying on
Etheridge, the Adams court also noted that the cap only applied after the jury completed its
constitutional duty: rendering the verdict. Id. In effect, Missouri’s legislature had the “right to
abrogate a cause of action cognizable under common law completely” and thus “limit recovery
in those causes of action.” Id. (citations omitted). But see Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the
Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 730
(1993) (describing jury fact-finding as a “qualitative assessment of the facts” and a “deter-
mination of the legal consequences of the facts”).
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non-economic damages for injuries to a mother and a newborn that arose during
prenatal care and delivery.143 The trial judge cited Adams and reduced non-economic
damages pursuant to Missouri’s cap.144
Like the Virginia and Washington Supreme Courts, the Missouri Supreme Court
initially focused on the scope of the jury trial right as it existed in the common law
in 1820 when Missouri’s constitution was adopted.145 According to Watts, since
approximately 1607, the English common law allowed jury awards for both eco-
nomic and non-economic damage arising out of medical negligence.146 When
Missouri enacted its civil jury trial clause such damages were still allowed in com-
mon law cases.147 Moreover, in Missouri the amount or value of compensatory
damages had always been within the scope of the civil jury’s fact-finding purview.148
According to Watts, compensatory damage caps in medical malpractice cases
neither existed nor were contemplated by the common law when Missouri enacted
its inviolate civil jury right.149 The Watts court was unpersuaded by the Adams
court’s reasoning that a determination of the value or amount of damages was
outside the scope of the jury’s constitutional role.150 Watts disregarded this view as
misconstruing the nature of the civil jury trial right once it attached.151 The common
law recognized cases for medical negligence152 and, because the jury trial right
143 Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 635–36.
144 Id. at 636. But see MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2015) ($400,000 to $700,000 cap range
enacted after Watts).
145 Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 638. Missouri’s constitution was adopted fifty years after the
Virginia Constitution and sixty years before the Washington Constitution.
146 Id. at 638, 640 (declaring “the amount of noneconomic damages . . . a fact that must
be determined by a jury” and protected by the state right to a civil jury); see also id. (finding
that medical negligence in the English common law was one of five types of private wrongs
that were brought in courts of law, not equity or admiralty).
147 Id. at 638–39 (describing the present cause of action as one fitting into the category of
cases that were tried by juries at common law).
148 Id. at 639–40 (declaring fact-finding on both liability and damages within the civil
jury’s constitutional task).
149 Id. at 639 (finding that when Missouri’s constitution was adopted in 1820 “the right
to trial by jury . . . was not subject to legislative limits on damages”).
150 Id. at 641–46. According to Watts, Adams suffered from four fundamental flaws. Id.
at 642. First, Adams failed to recognize that the determination of damages was “one of the
most significant constitutional roles performed by the jury.” Id. Second, the unavoidable
result of Adams was that the civil jury trial right was directly subject to legislative limitations,
which impermissibly altered constitutional norms. Id. (citations omitted) (“[A] statute may
not infringe on a constitutional right; if the two are in conflict, then it is the statute rather than
the constitution that must give way.”). Third, Adams relied on authority that found the civil
jury trial right did not extend to civil penalties, as opposed to common law damages. Id. at
643–44. Finally, Missouri’s inviolate civil jury trial right was distinguishable from Virginia’s
sacred civil jury trial right and thus Adams’ reliance on Etheridge was misplaced. Id. at 644.
151 Id. at 642–43.
152 Id. at 638.
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attached to these claims, the jury’s findings on both liability and damages were
“beyond the reach of hostile legislation.”153 Watts acknowledged remittitur and other
common law procedures that allowed modification of the jury’s award.154 But those
procedures were rarely authorized.155 Moreover, Missouri retained the common
law’s “long-standing reluctance” to interrupt the jury’s factual findings.156 Accord-
ingly, the Missouri legislature lacked authority to modify state constitutional jury
procedures that reflected common law principles.157
As demonstrated, state supreme courts sharply disagree about the scope and
effect of state civil jury trial clauses and the nature of that right at common law.158
Such a split is curious considering all but a few states have adopted the English
common law as the interpretive basis of the nature and scope of the civil jury trial
right.159 The core dispute among states is the scope of state legislative power to alter
or replace the jury’s determination of the value of an injury.160 Cap-approving 
153 Id. at 642 (internal quotation marks omitted).
154 Id. at 639 (discussing rarity of remittitur procedure in Missouri for fear of tampering
with the jury’s constitutional role as fact-finder).
155 See id. at 638–39 (discussing how English common law judges granted new trials only
in cases in which the verdict was deemed inconsistent with the evidence).
156 Id. at 639.
157 Id. at 642–43.
158 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 348–49 (describing caps as involving the intersection of
legislative prerogative and jury authority to determine damages).
159 See infra note 370 and accompanying text.
160 After Etheridge and Sofie, courts also continued to disagree on whether caps violate
other provisions of state constitutions. Compare Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So.
2d 156 (Ala. 1991) (holding $400,000 non-economic damage cap unconstitutionally bur-
dened the state right to a trial), Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill.
2010) ($500,000–$1,000,000 non-economic damage caps constituted an unconstitutional
legislative remittitur), Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (holding
$500,000 non-economic damage cap violated state special legislation and separation of
powers clauses), Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991) (holding $875,000 non-
economic damage cap violated the state equal protection clause), State ex rel. Ohio Acad.
of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999) (holding $250,000 to $500,000
sliding scale cap against non-economic damages violated state guarantee of due process, state
separation of powers clause, and state one-subject rule), Woods v. Unity Health Ctr., Inc.,
196 P.3d 529 (Okla. 2008) (holding service rules in medical malpractice cases is an im-
permissible special law), and Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis.
2005) (holding $350,000 cap violated the state constitutional guarantee of equal protection;
no litigation on subsequent $750,000 non-economic damage cap), with Fed. Express Corp.
v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (D.N.M. 2002) (holding $600,000 cap against total
damages did not violate state equal protection clause), Stinnett v. Tam, 198 Cal. App. Rptr.
3d 1412 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding $250,000 cap against non-economic damages
did not violate the state equal protection clause), Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists P.C., 851 P.2d
901 (Colo. 1993) (holding $1 million cap against total damages and $250,000 cap against
non-economic damages neither infringed on a fundamental right nor affected a suspect
classification under state constitution; cap meets rational basis standard), Univ. of Miami v.
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Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993) (holding $500,000 non-economic damage cap against
medical providers and $1 million non-economic damage cap against medical practitioners
did not violate the state right to access to courts, equal protection, substantive due process,
single subject rule, nondelegation doctrine, or the takings clause), overruled in part by Estate
of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014) (plurality opinion) (non-economic
damage cap in wrongful death cases violated the state equal protection clause), Samsel v.
Wheeler Trans. Serv., Inc., 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990) (holding $250,000 cap against non-
economic damages does not violate the state constitutional right to reparation for an injury
after due process), Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 85 So. 3d 39 (La. 2012) (holding $500,000 cap
against general damages in medical malpractice cases did not violate the state equal
protection or adequate remedies clauses), Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard Univ.,
607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992) (holding $500,000 cap against total damages did not violate the
state equal protection clause), Murphy v. Edmunds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992) (holding
$350,000 cap against non-economic damages in personal injury cases did not violate state
equal protection clause), aff’d, DRD Pool Serv. Inc., v. Freed, 5 A.3d 45 (Md. 2010) (holding
$650,000 cap constitutional on basis of stare decisis), Schweich v. Ziegler Inc., 463 N.W.2d
722 (Minn. 1990) (holding $400,000 cap against intangible losses does not violate the state
constitutional right to a remedy), Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo.
1993) (holding $350,000 non-economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases did not
violate the state equal protection clause or open courts doctrine), overruled on other grounds
by Watts v. Cox Med. Ctr., 376 S.W.3d 633, 633 (Mo. 2012) (no litigation on subsequently
enacted $400,000 to $700,000 cap range), Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health
Sys. Inc., 633 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003) (holding $1.25 million cap against total damages in
medical malpractice cases did not violate the state equal protection clause, open courts or
separation of powers doctrines, or principles prohibiting special legislation), Arbino v.
Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio 2007) (holding $350,000 to $500,000 cap did not
violate the state right to a remedy, open courts, due process, or equal protection; nor does cap
violate the state separation of powers doctrine), Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135 (Utah 2004)
(holding $250,000 non-economic damages violated neither separation of powers nor open
courts, uniform operation of laws, or due process provisions of the state constitution),
MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va. 2011) (holding $500,000 cap did
not violate separation of powers, equal protection, special legislation, or special remedies
provisions of the state constitution), Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2001)
(holding cap does not violate equal protection clause or separation of powers doctrine),
Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991) (holding $1 million
non-economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases does not violate the state equal
protection or substantive due process clauses; nor did cap constitute special legislation), and
Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp. Inc., 623 N.W.2d 776 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (holding $350,000
non-economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases did not violate the state equal
protection or due process clauses; nor did cap violate the state constitutional right to access
to courts or the state separation of powers doctrine), overruled on other grounds by Ferdon
ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 454–56 (Wis. 2005).
Some courts were in disagreement before Etheridge and Sofie. Compare Carson v. Maurer,
424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (holding $250,000 non-economic damage cap in medical malprac-
tice cases violated the state equal protection clause), with Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d
1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding $250,000 cap against non-economic damages did not involve
a suspect class or a fundamental right; rational basis standard met), Fein v. Permanente Med.
Grp., 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (holding $250,000 cap against non-economic damages did
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jurisprudence suggests that legislative authority includes the power to alter common
law rights. However, those courts fail to explain how such alterations do not also
change the state constitution itself.161 Cap-disapproving jurisprudence holds that
curtailment of the civil jury trial right exceeds legislative authority.162 But despite
recent trends, those courts are in the minority.
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence appears to favor the view that the amount or
value of damages is a fact that must be found by the civil jury and that such valuation
is fully enforceable in common law cases.163 But as Sofie noted, the federal civil jury
trial right is unenforceable against the states.164 Next, this Article turns to Sixth Amend-
ment Criminal Jury Trial Clause, which is binding against the states165 and which
examines a similar attempt to legislatively mandate juryless fact-finding. Thomas has
recently argued that at the time of ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the English civil
jury was in many ways similar to the English criminal jury166 and that “until the
nineteenth century the criminal and civil jur[ies] were inseparable.”167 Thus, Sixth
not violate the state due process or equal protection clauses), and Prendergast v. Nelson, 256
N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977) (finding defendant failed to rebut the presumption that cap was
constitutional). Additionally, see Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988)
(holding that a $500,000 cap against non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases
violated open courts provision of the state constitution; a subsequent state constitutional
amendment allowed for caps). See generally Knowles ex rel. Knowles v. United States, 544
N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996) (holding $500,000 cap against non-economic damages, unlike cap
against total damages, did not violate the state open courts doctrine or due process clause).
161 Dimick v. Schiedt, 292 U.S. 474, 487 (1987).
162 See id. at 486.
163 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 348 (arguing that the Seventh Amendment is “[l]ost in
the shuffle” of proposed federal tort reform and hypothesizing whether the federal civil jury
trial right would be a barrier to federal caps); Murphy, supra note 142, at 723, 726–27
(“factfinding is a constitutional function of the civil jury” and the jury’s purpose is serving
“the ultimate goal of just adjudication”); Whitehouse, supra note 101, at 1252 (describing
fact-finding as the core Seventh Amendment civil jury function).
164 Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 716 (Wash. 1989); see Murphy, supra note
142, at 724 n.2. Murphy describes the lack of a coherent theory of “jury authority,” which
Murphy defines as “the decisional role that the [U.S.] Constitution mandates for the jury once
an entitlement to trial by jury has been triggered.” Id. at 724 (footnotes omitted). Murphy
also discusses the Court’s lack of guidance on why some issues are exclusively for the jury,
the judge, or subject to some judicial intervention or review after a jury verdict. Id. at 725–26
(describing jury authority as disjointed and identifying guidelines sentencing and punitive
damages as current evidence of disjointedness); see also Murphy, supra note 5, at 351–52
(discussing the civil jury’s role as a check on legislative power and theorizing whether
legislatures can invade the jury’s constitutional authority).
165 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (guaranteeing the right to a crimi-
nal jury in nonpetty cases).
166 See Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand
Juries and the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1195, 1207 (2014).
167 Id. (quoting John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the
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Amendment jurisprudence should provide useful and significant instruction about
the nature and scope of jury trial rights and the limits of legislative authority to alter
those rights.168
II. JURYLESS FACT-FINDING IN CRIMINAL CASES
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has recently examined a question similar to that
which state supreme courts have been in conflict, albeit in a different context: whether
legislative authority exists to mandate juryless fact-finding at the sentencing stage of a
criminal prosecution. As used in this part, the term “juryless fact-finding” refers to state
and federal laws that remove the jury from sentencing completely or that allow recon-
sideration of the jury’s trial findings during a subsequent sentencing hearing. In this
sense, some sentencing procedures ultimately distinguished when a jury was required
or was not required. The Court ultimately found that mandated juryless fact-finding at
sentencing impermissibly lessened the jury’s fact-finder role and allowed intrusion on
the jury’s verdict or decree. This Article argues that mandated juryless fact-finding
in civil cases has the same impermissible effect as mandated juryless fact-finding in
criminal cases.
Recent Sixth Amendment criminal sentencing jurisprudence grounds itself on
common law principles and offers three lessons about the nature and scope of jury
trial rights at the time of the founding. First, modern procedures cannot significantly
alter certain common law characteristics of the jury right. Second, mandatory removal
of the jury as the primary fact-finder was not authorized in common law cases.
Third, a common law jury’s factual determinations were fully enforceable except in
exceptional circumstances. These lessons about the limits of legislative authority to
alter the scope and nature of criminal jury trial rights are of particular importance
when considering whether compensatory damage caps impermissibly alter the scope
and nature of civil jury trial rights.
Criminal sentencing procedure in the United States has undergone dramatic
changes since the founding. These changes altered the historical nature of the criminal
jury trial right in two significant ways: first, by removing fact-finding that supported
punishment from the purview of the criminal jury; and second, by allowing recon-
sideration of the criminal jury’s trial findings at a lower standard of proof at sentenc-
ing. Such alterations were the result of the Court’s initial establishment of legislative
authority to designate certain facts in a criminal case “elements” of the offense and
other facts “enhancements” to the punishment.169 This distinction proved significant.
The reasonable doubt standard applied to elements and required a jury.170 The
French Revolution, in THE JURY TRIAL IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, 1700–1900 (Antonio
Padoa Schioppa ed., 1987)).
168 See generally Murphy, supra note 142, at 742–43 (describing how the Founders had
a unified vision of jury trial rights and how the U.S. Constitution’s “textual segregation” of
criminal and civil jury trial rights was more “formal than substantive”).
169 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 82–86 (1986).
170 Id. at 84 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
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preponderance of the evidence standard applied to enhancements and did not require
a jury.171
The Sixth Amendment does not specifically mention criminal sentencing, but
a brief history of sentencing procedure at the time of the founding may be helpful
to comprehending post-founding developments. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.172
The introductory clause “in all criminal prosecutions” prefaces all of the included
procedural rights and protections,173 of which there are seven.174 This Article focuses
on the right to a criminal jury.
As noted by Professors Nancy King and Susan Klein, before the founding there
were relatively few felony offenses175 and for most a predetermined sentence re-
sulted, which rarely implicated the Sixth Amendment.176 In pre-founding felony
171 Id. at 83–84.
172 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
173 Benjamin C. McMurray, Challenging Untested Facts at Sentencing: The Applicability
of Crawford at Sentencing After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 589, 615 (2006).
174 Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487,
492 (2009) (identifying the Sixth Amendment’s seven procedural protections).
175 Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467,
1507–08 (2001) (noting only twenty-two federal crimes in 1790).
176 Penny J. White, “He Said,” “She Said,” and Issues of Life and Death: The Right to Con-
frontation at Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 387, 396–97 (2007)
(distinguishing modern day trials as a bifurcated fact-finding process of guilt or innocence by a
jury and punishment by a judge; eighteenth century trials collapsed both stages and each offense
mandated a particular punishment). A common sentence for felonies was death. See John G.
Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1967, 2011 (2005) (citing Whitnan J. Hou, Capital Retrials and Resentencing: Whether
to Appeal and Resentencing Fairness, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 19, 30 (2003)). “At the time the [Bill of
Rights] was adopted in 1791, the States uniformly followed the common-law practice of making
death the exclusive and mandatory sentence for certain specified offenses.” Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (plurality opinion) (1976) (citing HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 5–6, 15, 27–28 (rev. ed. 1967)). Execution could be by hanging, em-
bowelment, or being burned alive. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 376 (photo. reprint 2008) (2d American ed. 1799). Punishment for other felonies
included mutilation or dismembering, slitting of the nostrils, branding of the hand, whipping,
hard labor, exile, banishment, loss of liberty, and temporary imprisonment. Id. at 377. Blackstone
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cases the defendant could predict a sentence with precision from the face of the charg-
ing instrument, which aligned punishment with the crime.177 Professor John Douglass
posited that criminal prosecutions consisted of a unitary trial and sentencing proceed-
ing.178 Douglass claims that by necessity pre-founding procedure required felony sen-
tencing evidence to be presented and judged during the trial.179 According to Professors
Carissa and Andrew Hessick, in both purpose and effect the process of sentencing
was “virtually indistinguishable from the process of conviction”180 because, as Douglass
argues, “the trial was the sentencing.”181
made clear that the quantity or degree of punishment was “ascertained for every offence; and
that it [was] not left in the breast of any judge, nor even of a jury, to alter that judgment. . . .”
Id. Blackstone warned that “if judgments were to be the private opinions of the judge, men
would then be slaves to their magistrates[,] [a]nd would live in society without knowing
exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays them under.” Id.
177 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note
176, at 376 (after the verdict the court pronounced the judgment “which the law hath annexed
to the crime”); Stephanos Bibas, Two Cheers, Not Three, for Sixth Amendment Originalism,
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 46, 48 (2011) (maintaining that punishment was immediately
imposed after guilt was announced); Douglass, supra note 176, at 1977 (describing English
and early U.S. criminal law as dominated by mandatory penalties, not sentencing discretion).
See generally McMurray, supra note 173, at 592 (hypothesizing that from the charging
instrument alone, defendants at the time of the trial knew the sentence they would receive
if convicted); White, supra note 176, at 397 (describing how guilt and punishment were
deciding in one proceeding).
178 See Douglass, supra note 176, at 2008 (in the Framers’ time, “a unitary trial and a
single jury verdict determined not only guilt or innocence, but life or death . . . . With that
system as their point of reference, they crafted a single set of adversarial rights to govern all
of the proceedings . . . .”); see also White, supra note 176, at 397 (“[T]he criminal
prosecutions, to which the Framers referred when they drafted the Sixth Amendment,”
included the “finding of guilt” and “setting of punishment . . . in one proceeding.”).
179 Douglass, supra note 176, at 2008; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 480 n.7 (noting that,
upon misdemeanants, judges frequently imposed fines or whippings); Douglass, supra note
176, at 2016 (noting that in the late eighteenth century, English and colonial American judges
“exercised a range of discretion in choosing punishment for misdemeanants”).
180 Carissa B. Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sen-
tencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 51 (2011) (noting that U.S. colonial judges did not conduct formal
sentencing proceedings because most crimes carried a particular penalty); see also Bibas,
supra note 177, at 46 (“Eighteenth-century trials contained no sentencing phase . . . . [They
were] nothing like modern sentencing proceedings.”); Douglass, supra note 176, at 1972
(“Unitary capital trials were the norm when the Sixth Amendment was created.”); Id. at 2011
(cautioning against the temptation to conclude that “the Sixth Amendment contemplates no
sentencing rights” simply “because it contemplates no separate sentencing proceeding”); Susan
N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 302–03 (1992)
(describing how the jury decided the facts on which sentencing was based, rendering a
separate proceeding for sentencing unnecessary); White, supra note 176, at 396 (positing that
sentencing decisions and determinations of guilt were collapsed into a single proceeding).
181 Douglass, supra note 176, at 1973 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1972 (“Bifurcation—
separating the guilt determination from the choice of an appropriate penalty—was a procedure
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During the early twentieth century, criminal sentencing had become a distinct
and separate procedural phase of the Sixth Amendment’s “criminal prosecution.”182
While by the 1960s the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause became the
vehicle through which the Sixth Amendment was interpreted to apply to criminal
defendants in state courts,183 the Sixth Amendment was not incorporated in whole.184
Interpretations of what due process required varied between the Amendment’s clauses
and each clause had to be separately deemed fundamental and essential to a fair
trial.185 Additionally, some clauses were interpreted to apply only during the trial,
while others applied beyond the trial.186 With regard to sentencing, the Sixth Amend-
ment initially provided little protection against mandatory juryless fact-finding.187
By the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Honorable Marvin Frankel and
others had long questioned the lack of procedural and substantive rules governing
that evolved after the founding . . . .”); id. at 2020 (“It was largely after the framing that the
unified world [of trial and sentencing] evolved into the separate worlds.”); Hessick & Hessick,
supra note 180, at 51 (describing pre-founding sentencing as part of the trial); White, supra
note 176, at 397 (theorizing how that pre-founding felony juries decided both the guilt and
sentence of the defendant).
182 See Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics
in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 279 (2005) (detailing the movement
towards a structured sentencing procedure that brought greater certainty and clarity); Susan
R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L.
REV. 693, 699 (2005) (describing how “[t]he indeterminate sentencing model began to
unravel in the early 1970s”); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process, History, and
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 243 (2001) (hypothesizing that the
arbitrariness at sentencing hearings was compounded by the lack of rules of evidence and
standards of proof).
183 See Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 391 (2006).
184 See id.
185 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
Jury Trial Clause applies against the States); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)
(applying the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause against the states); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause is obliga-
tory against the states).
186 See Chhablani, supra note 174, at 520–21 (discussing how the term “criminal
prosecution” depends on the procedural right at issue).
187 Compare Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000) (noting that Jury Trial
Clause applies to the punishment stage of the criminal prosecution), and Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128, 134–36 (1967) (maintaining that counsel was required at every critical stage
of the criminal prosecution, including sentencing and probation hearings), with Williams v.
Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 583–84 (1959) (affirming Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949), and holding that there is no right to confront evidence used to fix punishment). See
generally Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Unbranding Confrontation as Only a Trial Right, 65
HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (2014) [hereinafter Sanders, Unbranding Confrontation]; Shaakirrah R.
Sanders, Making the Right Call for Confrontation at Felony Sentencing, 47 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 791 (2014) [hereinafter Sanders, Making the Right Call ].
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sentencing hearings.188 Frankel, who is widely considered as the “father” of the late
twentieth-century criminal sentencing reform,189 saw some of his critique addressed
in In re Winship190 and Mullaney v. Wilbur.191 Winship dubbed the reasonable doubt
standard a protectant of the presumption of innocence.192 Every necessary fact that
constituted the charged offense193 must be proved by that standard.194 Mullaney
extended the reasonable doubt standard to “elements of the offense.”195 But neither
188 Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1972).
189 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Marvin Frankel, Federal Judge and Pioneer of
Sentencing Guidelines, Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002, at C15.
190 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
191 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
192 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. Winship was twelve years of age when he allegedly
stole $112.00 from a woman’s pocketbook. Id. at 359–60. Section 744(b) of the New York
Family Court Act required that “[a]ny determination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory]
hearing that a [juvenile] did act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence’”
Id. at 360 (quoting N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 744(B)). Winship was sentenced to eighteen months,
a sentence which could be reviewed and extended annually. Id. The Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. Id.; see also In re Samuel W., 247
N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1969), judgment rev’d by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 258 (1970). The New
York Court of Appeals held that juvenile proceedings were distinguishable from criminal
prosecutions. In re Samuel W., 247 N.E.2d. at 254. Guilt in juvenile adjudications were not
convictions that affected rights or privileges; nor did juvenile convictions enjoy the protec-
tive cover of constitutionality. Id. at 254–55. Because delinquency status was not a crime and
juvenile proceedings were not criminal, there was no deprivation of any rights. Id. at 257.
193 Winship, 397 U.S. at 358–59.
194 Id. at 364. The Court reasoned that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard dated back
to the founding and was long assumed to be constitutionally required in criminal cases, even
delinquency proceeding against juveniles. Id. at 360, 362, 367–68 (citations omitted). But see
id. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting) (doubting whether guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt
was expressly or impliedly commanded by the Constitution).
195 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704 (holding that the “Due Process Clause requires the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt [elements of the offense] . . . .”). Mullaney interpreted
a Maine law that defined murder as an unlawful killing with malice aforethought, either
expressed or implied; a killing without malice aforethought was manslaughter. Id. at 686 n.3
(quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (West 1964)). The prosecution argued defendants
should have the burden to prove heat of passion, which would qualify the killing as man-
slaughter. Id. at 699. The Court rejected Maine’s argument and reasoned that Winship was
not limited to “elements” as defined by state law. Id. But see Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 205–08 (1977) (excluding affirmative defenses from the category of facts that must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt). See generally Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer,
Searching for the “Tail of the Dog”: Finding “Elements” of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan
v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1081 (1999) (“Patterson opened the door for
creative legislatures to evade the fundamental protections afforded in Winship . . . .”); Nelson
E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional
Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 462–63 (1985) (describing Mullaney and Patterson
as “a dispute over how to delineate the limits of a state’s power to define the ‘essential facts’
of a crime”).
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Winship nor Mullaney addressed how to determine which facts constituted “ele-
ments” or whether the reasonable doubt standard applied at sentencing hearings.196
State and federal legislatures, also responding to Frankel’s critique, codified
structured sentencing rules to fix punishment.197 Some of these rules removed fact-
finding from the purview of the criminal jury and the sentencing judge. One exam-
ple was Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act (MMSA),198 which
imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for offenses committed while
in “visible possess[ion]” of a firearm.199 Pennsylvania’s MMSA expressly provided
that “visible possess[ion]” was not an “element” of the underlying crime and that
whether visible possession occurred “shall be determined at sentencing.”200 The
MMSA directed sentencing courts to consider evidence that was introduced at trial
as well as “any necessary additional evidence” offered by either the defendant or the
Commonwealth.201 After four sentencing judges refused to impose the mandatory
minimum sentence because it did not allow the jury to evaluate the factual accuracy
of whether a defendant “visibly possessed” a firearm,202 this provision was tested in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania.203
In examining the constitutionality of structured sentencing rules, the Court would
initially hinge the criminal jury trial right on whether the fact was an element to be
proven at trial or whether the fact merely enhanced the punishment imposed at a sen-
tencing hearing. The McMillan Court coined the term “sentencing enhancement,”204
196 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; see also Patterson, 432 U.S. at 205–08 (distinguishing
between affirmative defenses and statutory elements and reasoning that affirmative defenses
do not allow the state to presume or infer any facts against defendants); Ronald J. Allen &
Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional Command or Con-
stitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 202 (2005) (proposing that one reading of
Apprendi and Winship is that a jury decision may be required even if only by a preponderance
of the evidence); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a
World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1103 (2001) (discussing applicability of rea-
sonable doubt to every fact); Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to the Future: Does Apprendi Bar
a Legislature’s Power to Shift the Burden of Proof Away from the Prosecution by Labeling
an Element of a Traditional Crime as an Affirmative Defense, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1351, 1357
(2003) (pointing out that Winship could be read to apply the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard to sentencing factors).
197 See Berman, supra note 183, at 394–95 n.44.
198 Id. at 396.
199 Id.
200 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81 n.1 (1986).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 82–84.
203 477 U.S. 79, 80 (1986); see also Berman, supra note 183, at 394 (discussing Pennsyl-
vania sentencing guidelines); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1988) (noting the
need for post-trial fact-finding procedures).
204 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 500 (Thomas, J., concurring) (McMillan
“spawned a special sort of fact known as a sentencing enhancement.”); Knoll & Singer,
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and distinguished enhancements from “offense elements.”205 The element/enhance-
ment distinction became the constitutional limit to legislative authority to mandate
juryless fact-finding at criminal sentencing hearings.206 While McMillan vested state
legislatures with the freedom to elect between which facts were elements or en-
hancements,207 McMillan also imposed several limitations on a state’s ability to do
so. First, a state could not discard the presumption of innocence or otherwise relieve
the prosecution of its burden of proof on the sentencing factor.208 Second, an en-
hancement could not increase the maximum statutory sentence allowed under the
underlying criminal offense.209 Finally, the elements of an underlying offense must
remain unaltered.210
McMillan made clear that “no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing” ex-
isted, even where a sentence turned on specific factual findings.211 After McMillan,
the Court recognized an internal conflict between the nature and scope of the
criminal jury right as it existed in the common law before the founding and
McMillan’s allowance of juryless fact-finding.212 This conflict would ultimately
undermine McMillan.
Post-McMillan jurisprudence provides three lessons about the scope and nature
of the Sixth Amendment Criminal Jury Trial Clause. This jurisprudence acknowl-
edged a right to a jury finding on facts that are material to punishment, regardless
of whether such facts were found at a trial or at a criminal sentencing hearing. This
supra note 195, at 1058 (attributing the “birth of the ‘sentencing factor’” to McMillan); see
also Jeffrey L. Fisher, Originalism as an Anchor for the Sixth Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 53, 55 (2011) (defining a sentencing factor as a particular fact that subjects the
defendant to an increased punishment).
205 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86.
206 Id. at 85–88 (states have authority “to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried
out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion”) (quoting
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02); see also Berman, supra note 183, at 399.
207 477 U.S. at 85–86. The Court reasoned that the MMSA did not disregard the
presumption of innocence; in fact, it created no presumptions. Id. at 86–87. Nor did the
MMSA relieve the prosecution of its burden. Id. at 87. The MMSA neither altered the
maximum penalty for the crime committed nor created a separate offense calling for a
separate penalty. Id. at 87–88. Finally, the MMSA did not change the definition of any
existing offense. Id. at 89; see also Bibas, supra note 177, at 1106 (discussing the factors that
supported the Apprendi Court’s finding that sentencing enhancements were constitutional).
208 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86–87.
209 Id. at 87–88.
210 Id. at 89–90.
211 Id. at 93 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984)).
212 See generally Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt
Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1701 (1987); Herman, supra note 180, at 323–25, 328, 344
(arguing that McMillan undermined Due Process); Knoll & Singer, supra note 195, at
1061–62, 1067–68, 1078–79 (discussing the historical difference between an “offense,” its
“elements,” and facts looked to by a judge to determine the sentence).
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Article argues that these lessons should prove helpful to a resolution of mandatory
juryless fact-finding in civil cases.
Apprendi v. New Jersey213 provides the first lesson from the Sixth Amendment
Criminal Jury Trial Clause: modern procedures cannot significantly alter certain
common law characteristics of the jury trial right.214 Apprendi was charged under
a New Jersey statute that classified unlawful possession of a firearm a second-degree
offense.215 Punishment for this offense ranged between five and ten years.216 Under
a separate statute, New Jersey extended the term of imprisonment if the unlawful
possession occurred while committing a racially motivated crime.217 Racial motiva-
tion did not require a finding by a jury, could be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, and increased the maximum punishment from five-to-ten years to ten-to-
twenty years.218 Apprendi pled guilty to two counts of unlawful possession (each of
which carried a maximum punishment of ten years).219 As part of the plea agree-
ment, New Jersey reserved the right to request an enhanced sentence based on the
grounds that Apprendi acted with biased purpose.220 On one count of unlawful
213 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
214 Id. at 476–90; see also Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1771, 1814 n.180 (2003) (commenting that Apprendi forbids “certain determinations from
being left to sentencing”). One year prior to Apprendi, the Court held that a jury was required
to find the traditional elements of an offense. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252
(1999). Jones was convicted of violating the federal carjacking statute which carried a
maximum 15-year sentence, unless serious bodily injury or death occurred. Id. at 230; 18
U.S.C. § 2119 (1988). Jones’s 25-year sentence was overturned because the serious bodily
injury enhancement was not made by a jury. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230–31. Later, in Castillo v.
United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000), the Court appeared to provide a framework to distinguish
between “traditional elements” and “sentencing enhancements.” Castillo, 530 U.S. at 124–
30. Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder federal officers in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1). Id. at 122. The federal statute also prohibited the use or carrying of a “firearm”
in relation to a crime of violence and penalties increased dramatically when the firearm was
a “machine gun.” Id. (quoting § 924(c)(1)). The Court held that despite Congress’s designa-
tion to the contrary, the “machine gun” enhancement constituted a traditional element of a
separate offense and required a jury finding. Id. at 121.
215 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468. Apprendi admitted that he fired several shots into the home
of an African-American family that recently moved into Apprendi’s all-white neighborhood.
Id. at 469. According to statements later retracted by Apprendi, he was hostile towards blacks
moving into the neighborhood. Id.
216 Id. at 468.
217 Id. at 468–69.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 469–70. Apprendi also pled guilty to third-degree unlawful possession of an anti-
personnel bomb. Id. at 470. That offense carried a penalty range of three to five years. Id.
220 Id. A twenty-three-count grand jury indictment did not refer to the hate crime statute
or allege that Apprendi acted with a racially biased purpose. Id. at 469. The potential
application of the hate crime enhancement was significant. See id. at 470. The maximum
consecutive sentence on the two counts of unlawful possession was an aggregate of twenty
268 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:235
possession, the sentencing judge found that Apprendi acted with a racial motiva-
tion221 and imposed a twelve-year sentence instead of a ten-year sentence.222 Relying
on McMillan, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that motivation was a traditional
sentencing factor.223
Apprendi qualified McMillan’s grant of legislative authority to label some facts
elements that required a jury and other facts enhancements that did not require a
jury.224 Apprendi found the right to a jury determination of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt on all elements of an offense was a historical foundation of the common
law.225 As noted before Apprendi by Professors Susan Herman, Mark Knoll, and
Nelson Roth, criminal prosecutions at the time of the founding linked guilt of a fact
with punishment.226 In short, there was no distinction between elements and en-
hancements.227 Apprendi rejected the mere use of the label “sentencing enhance-
ment” as a “principled basis” for treating elements and enhancements differently.228
Reflecting on the common law, the Court recognized that “[a]ny possible distinction
between an ‘element’ and a ‘sentencing factor’ was unknown to the practice of . . .
trial by jury[] . . . as it existed during the years surrounding our Nation’s Founding.”229
Due to the “invariable linkage” at common law between the crime and the punish-
ment, common law trial judges had very little explicit discretion at criminal sentenc-
ing.230 To whatever extent trial judges later exercised discretion at sentencing, the
punishment was required to be within the statutory limits of the offense.231
Apprendi teaches that even though the practice of unitary trial and sentencing
may have changed, modern courts cannot depart “from the jury tradition that is an
indispensable part of [the U.S.] criminal justice system.”232 Apprendi declared the
years. Id. If the judge enhanced one of the counts of unlawful possession, the maximum
on that count alone was twenty years and the maximum for both counts could be thirty
years. Id.
221 Id. at 471.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 494.
224 Id. at 487 n.13.
225 Id. at 477 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 176, at *343).
226 Herman, supra note 180, at 302–03; Knoll & Singer, supra note 195, at 1081; Roth &
Sundby, supra note 195, at 462–63.
227 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485.
228 Id. at 476.
229 Id. at 478.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 481.
232 Id. at 497. Justice Thomas argued that the Sixth Amendment’s text and structure
reflected the jury’s constitutionally prescribed role as ultimate fact-finder. See id. at 518
(Thomas, J., concurring) (describing Apprendi as reflecting the original meaning of the Sixth
Amendment).
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jury trial right one of surpassing importance in the common law.233 Apprendi limited
McMillan to the extent that designating certain facts enhancements234 rather than
elements could thwart the reasonable doubt standard announced in Winship.235
Apprendi embraced the principle that “any fact [other than a prior conviction] that
increase[d] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”236 Legislatures could
not remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increased the prescribed range
of penalties to which a criminal defendant was exposed.237 The relevant inquiry was
not one of form, but effect: “[did] the required finding expose the defendant to a
greater punishment than that authorized by [the plea or] the jury’s guilty verdict?”238
Blakely v. Washington239 and United States v. Booker240 provide the second
lesson from the Sixth Amendment Criminal Jury Trial Clause: mandatory removal
of the jury as the primary fact-finder was not authorized in common law cases.
Apprendi renewed arguments that the Sixth Amendment required a jury determina-
tion of all facts that increased punishment, which fundamentally implicated some
state and federal guidelines sentencing schemes.241 While at least one concurring
Justice in Apprendi rejected this view, one dissenter foresaw the threat.242
233 Id. at 478 (majority opinion) (designating guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a
historically significant companion right to a criminal jury verdict and ruling that both reflect
“a profound judgment” about law enforcement and the administration of justice).
234 See id. at 485; see also Knoll & Singer, supra note 195, at 1118 (theorizing that
“Winship lives again”).
235 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485, 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252–53
(1999) (Stevens, J., concurring) (a legislature may not “remove from the jury the assessment
of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties”)); see also Fisher, supra note 204,
at 56 (describing Apprendi as a very easy case).
236 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; see also id. at 475–76 (discussing how Apprendi was
foreshadowed by Jones); Knoll & Singer, supra note 195, at 1114 (discussing how pre-
Apprendi jurisprudence excluded any item that would significantly increase the sentence
from being designated a sentencing factor).
237 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491–92.
238 Id. at 494.
239 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
240 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
241 See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 78–103 (1998) (arguing against limited judicial discretion
at criminal sentencing); Michael Tonry, Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission’s “Mandatory Guidelines,” 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 129, 132–33 n.12
(1991) (citations omitted) (identifying the lack of judicial discretion as a common complaint
about the Guidelines); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s
Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 93 (2003);
Breyer, supra note 203, at 5–6.
242 Compare Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.11 (Thomas, J., concurring), with id. at 552
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Blakely v. Washington examined sentencing guidelines enacted in Washington
State,243 which permitted departures from the guidelines’ minimum up to the statutory
maximum based on facts found at a sentencing hearing.244 All departures had to be
found by “substantial and compelling reason[s] justifying an exceptional source”
and justified in writing with findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting it.245
Blakely was charged with first-degree kidnapping, but pled guilty to second-degree
kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm.246 The sentencing
judge imposed a thirty-seven-month enhancement after finding Blakely acted with
“deliberate cruelty.”247 The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence and
the Washington Supreme Court denied discretionary review.248
Relying on Apprendi, the Blakely Court held that where additional facts were
essential to punishment, they must be found by a jury.249 In effect, “the relevant ‘statu-
tory maximum’ [was] not the maximum sentence . . . after finding additional facts,
but the maximum [sentence] . . . without additional [facts].”250 Blakely acknowledged
that Apprendi gave “intelligible content to the right of jury trial.”251 Blakely relied upon
the Framers’ unwillingness to allow government to define or delineate the jury’s role.252
Blakely described the jury as more than a “mere procedural formality, but a funda-
mental reservation of power in [the U.S.] constitutional structure.”253 Blakely affirmed
“the common-law ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict division of
243 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298–99.
244 Id. at 299; see also Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Con-
stitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1089 (2005) (explaining how
Washington sentencing departures work).
245 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A 120(2)–(3) (West
2016)).
246 Id. at 298–99. Blakely abducted his wife from their home, bound her with duct tape,
and forced her at knifepoint into a wooden box that was in the bed of Blakely’s pickup truck
in an effort to implore his wife to dismiss their pending divorce and the related trust pro-
ceedings. Id. at 298. When the couple’s thirteen-year-old son arrived home from school,
Blakely forced the child to follow in another vehicle. Id. The child ultimately escaped and
sought help when Blakely stopped at a gas station. Id. Blakely, with his wife, continued to
a friend’s house. Id. Blakely was arrested after the friend notified authorities. Id.
247 Id. at 300. At the sentencing hearing, the state recommended forty-nine to fifty-three
months imprisonment pursuant to the plea agreement. Id. The sentencing judge rejected the
state’s recommendation and imposed a sentence of ninety months based on deliberate cruelty,
which was “a statutorily enumerated ground for [a] departure in domestic-violence cases.” Id.
248 Id. at 301. Blakely argued on appeal that Washington’s “sentencing procedure deprived
him of his federal constitutional right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all
facts legally essential to his sentence.” Id.
249 Id. at 303–04.
250 Id. Because the additional facts were essential to punishment, they must be found by
a jury. See id. at 304.
251 Id. at 305.
252 Id. at 308.
253 Id. at 306.
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authority between judge and jury.”254 Any finding to the contrary would be an assault
on jury trials in general.255
The Blakely Court expressly declined to determine whether Apprendi implicated
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,256 but less than a year later the Booker Court
answered the question in the affirmative. Booker involved sentencing enhancements
that were based on the amount of drugs and the defendants’ role in the criminal
offense.257 Booker distinguished between mandatory and advisory sentencing models
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment Criminal Jury Trial Clause.258 Booker held
that the former implicated the criminal jury trial right while the latter did not.259 The
Booker Court found no constitutional distinction between Washington’s procedures
and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: both impermissibly thwarted the requirement
that punishment be based on facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.260
In other words, mandatory juryless fact-finding for purposes of fixing punishment
violated Apprendi.261
254 Id. at 313.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 305 n.9 (the Guidelines “are not before us, and we express no opinion on them”).
See generally Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal
Sentencing, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 785 (2008) (noting that twenty-nine states were
unaffected by Blakely or Booker); Fisher, supra note 204, at 56–57 (discussing the legal basis
for why Washington’s sentencing guidelines “undermined the Framers’ design”); Klein,
supra note 182, at 709–12 (noting an “immediate circuit split on whether Blakely applied to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines”); Reitz, supra note 244, at 1086 (noting that Blakely is
“notable for what it does not attempt”).
257 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005). Booker received a ninety-nine-
month sentencing enhancement for obstructing justice and possessing 566 grams of crack
cocaine. Id. In a companion case, United States v. Fanfan, a jury found 500 or more grams
of cocaine were involved. Id. at 228. The sentencing court found Fanfan responsible for 2.5
kilograms of cocaine powder and 261.6 grams of crack cocaine. Id. Fanfan was also found
to have played a leadership role in the criminal activity. Id. Fanfan would have received a
120-month enhancement, but the sentencing court declined to apply those provisions of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 228–29.
258 Id. at 233 (reasoning that if the federal guidelines were advisory, there would be no
Sixth Amendment implications).
259 Id. (“[W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence . . . , the
defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”).
260 Id. at 232 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303). A second Booker majority focused on
whether the Guidelines could be remedied. Exercising its power of severability, the second
Booker majority ruled that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines made them incompatible
with the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 258. Advisory guidelines and a reasonableness standard of
appellate review cured these incompatibilities. Id. at 259–63.
261 Id. at 244–45, 258–62; see also Timothy Lynch, One Cheer for United States v.
Booker, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 215, 216 (2005) (describing the Court’s unwillingness to
“untangle the knots that presently encumber[ed] the constitutional right to trial by jury”).
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Blakely and Booker teach that a jury determination of the facts that raised the
sentencing ceiling was a firmly rooted and constitutionally protected precept of the
common law.262 Booker acknowledged that under prior indeterminate schemes,
sentencing courts retained the ability to enhance a sentence.263 But as enhancements
increased under structured sentencing schemes, the jury’s finding on the underlying
crime became less significant.264 The federal and Washington sentencing schemes
mandated the removal of the jury from the process of fact-finding on issues that
were material to punishment.265 Such mandatory removal essentially forced the
Court to address the question of how the right to a criminal jury could be meaning-
fully preserved such that “the jury would still stand between the individual and the
power of the government . . . .”266 The Court was compelled to answer this question
not as a matter of jury trial formalism, but jury trial substance.267
Alleyne v. United States268 provides the third lesson from the Sixth Amendment
Criminal Jury Trial Clause: a common law jury’s factual determinations were fully
enforceable unless exceptional circumstances were presented. By their terms,
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker applied only when mandatory juryless fact-finding
involved imposition of a sentence more severe than the maximum penalty allowed
under a criminal statute (and after Blakely the sentencing guidelines calculation).269
After Apprendi but prior to Blakely and Booker, a plurality of the Court in Harris
v. United States distinguished between maximum and minimum sentences for
Apprendi purposes.270 According to the Harris plurality, the Framers would have
262 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 297, 313 (2004).
263 Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)). But
see generally Sanders, Unbranding Confrontation, supra note 187; Sanders, Making the
Right Call, supra note 187.
264 Booker, 543 U.S. at 236.
265 Id. at 226–27.
266 Id. at 237.
267 See id.
268 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
269 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 n.13 (2000).
270 536 U.S. 545, 550, 560–61, 568–69 (2002) (plurality opinion). Harris involved whether
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single crime, one of which brandishing is a sentencing
factor that may be considered by a judge after the trial, or multiple crimes, one of which bran-
dishing is an essential element that must be proved to a jury. Id. at 552. Section 924(c)(1)(A)
provides in relevant part:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime . . . , uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance
of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5
years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
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considered facts that increased the maximum sentence as elements of an aggravated
offense and thus within the domain of the jury.271 Facts that increased the minimum
sentence could not make the same claim.272 Otherwise stated for the purposes of
Apprendi’s constitutional analysis, only those facts that set the “outer limits of a
sentence”273 functioned like traditional elements.274
Alleyne rejected the distinction between facts that increase the minimum and
maximum punishment. Alleyne was charged with one count of robbery affecting
interstate commerce and one count of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of
violence, for which the minimum sentence was five years.275 Alleyne was also
charged with brandishing a firearm, which mandated a minimum punishment of
seven years.276 The jury rendered a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the
charge of robbery but not on the charge of brandishing, a result that supported only
a five year sentence.277 At the sentencing hearing, a judge found that brandishing
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). The government neither alleged brandishing nor referenced
subsection (ii) in the indictment. Harris, 536 U.S. at 551. Instead, Harris was charged with
knowingly carrying a firearm while trafficking drugs and received seven years punishment
based on the sentencing court’s finding that brandishing occurred. Id. The Fourth Circuit
ruled brandishing a sentencing factor, as had every other federal circuit court to address the
question. Id. at 551–52. The Harris plurality agreed. Id. at 552.
271 Id. at 557.
272 Id. The plurality acknowledged that even when the legislature does not explicitly
designate a fact an element or sentencing factor, competing interpretations of the statute may
apply depending on whether the fact was historically treated as an offense element, and
whether punishment was significantly increased. Id. at 552–54. The plurality reasoned that
section 924(c)(1)(A) either one, actually listed offense elements in a single sentence and
sentencing factors in subsections, or two, appeared to list all offense elements in a single
sentence but actually set out the elements of multiple offenses in subsections. Id. The five-to-
ten year brandishing “enhancement” was described as “consistent with traditional under-
standings about how sentencing factors operat[e]” and “precisely what one would expect
to see in provisions meant to identify matters for the sentencing judge’s consideration.” Id.
at 554.
273 Id. at 567.
274 Id. at 562–64 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13 (“We do not overrule McMillan.
We limit its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe
than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury’s verdict . . . .”)).
275 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013). Alleyne and an
accomplice robbed a store manager who was transferring daily deposits to a local bank. Id.
Alleyne and his accomplice targeted the manager by feigning car trouble, approaching the
manager’s vehicle with a gun, and demanding the store’s deposits, which the manager im-
mediately surrendered. Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 2156.
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occurred by a preponderance of the evidence and imposed a seven year sentence.278
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentencing enhancement.279
Alleyne described mandatory juryless fact-finding at criminal sentencing hear-
ings as a post-founding development that conflicted with the historical nature and
scope of the right to a criminal jury.280 Alleyne acknowledged that in the common
law, substantive criminal law tended to be sanction-specific and a particular sentence
was prescribed for a particular offense.281 Moreover, the “legally prescribed” penalty
affixed to the crime included the entire range of punishment.282 It followed that any
fact that triggered both the mandatory (or statutory) maximum and minimum
sentences were “ingredient[s] of the offense.”283 Elevating the low end or “floor” of
a sentencing range heightened “the loss of liberty associated with the crime[ ]”284 and
was as relevant as elevating the high end or “ceiling.”285
Alleyne was premised on the clear relationship at common law between crime
and punishment.286 Alleyne described Apprendi as a preservation of the historic role
of the jury as an intermediary between the state and a criminal defendant.287 Alleyne
agrees with Langbein’s conclusion that common law era sentencing judges had little
sentencing discretion.288 The Court recognized that “[w]hile some early American
statutes provided ranges of permissible sentences, . . . the ranges themselves were
linked to particular facts constituting the elements of the crime.”289 Reflecting on
common law and early U.S. colonial procedures, the Court found a well-established
practice of submitting to the jury every fact that served as a basis for the imposition
of or an increase in punishment.290 Alleyne found facts that trigger a mandatory
minimum also alter “the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant
is exposed.”291 Alleyne deemed it “impossible to dissociate the floor of a sentencing
range from the penalty affixed to the crime” because facts that increased either end
of the range of punishment produced a new penalty.292
278 Id.
279 Id. (citing United States v. Alleyne, 457 F. App’x 348, 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)).
280 See id. at 2158–59.
281 Id. at 2158. See generally Langbein, supra note 167 (describing English common law
trial juries).
282 Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 2161.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 2158.
287 Id. at 2161.
288 Id. at 2158 (citing Langbein, supra note 167, at 36–37).
289 Id. (citing STITH & CABRANES, supra note 241, at 9).
290 Id. at 2159; see also id. at 2160.
291 Id. at 2160 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 460, 490 (2000)).
292 Id.
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The lessons of Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, and Alleyne should cause cap approv-
ing state supreme courts some pause. Etheridge’s holding that a legislatively deter-
mined cap only dictates the “outer limit” or “ceiling” of a jury’s award appears to
conflict with both Apprendi and Alleyne’s directive that facts which affect the outer
and inner limit or ceiling are within the purview of the jury. Moreover, caps also
appear to conflict with the Court’s own understanding of civil jury trial procedure
as it existed in the common law before and after the time of the founding.293 The
Court has long recognized that at the time the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1791,
the parties in common law–based civil cases were entitled to a jury determination
of liability and damages—both of which were questions of fact.294 Additionally,
common law courts lacked authority to alter the civil jury’s damage award in an
action for personal injury.295
Of course, state supreme courts may not be persuaded that the Sixth Amend-
ment’s lessons are relevant to the issue of compensatory damage caps. Unlike the
Sixth Amendment Criminal Jury Trial Clause, the Seventh Amendment Civil Jury
Trial Clause has not been deemed fundamental or applicable against the states.296
But fundamentality only speaks to the level of scrutiny a court gives during its
review of an alleged constitutional violation.297 Fundamental rights like the criminal
293 See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 478 (1935).
294 Id. at 486–87; see also id. at 478 (“[I]n all cases sounding in damages, these damages
must be assessed by the jury and not by the court independently thereof[.]”); id. at 490 (Stone,
J., dissenting) (describing the scope of the Seventh Amendment as “the essentials of the jury
trial as it was known to the common law before the adoption of the Constitution”). It appears
that in some cases authority was exercised to “increase or abridge” the jury’s award, but only
where the amount of damages was certain. Id. at 479 (majority opinion). This rule did not
apply in personal tort actions unless the evidence before the court required a correction of
the amount of damages. Id. Unless the parties agreed, courts had no power to add or reduce
damages to a reasonable sum where a new trial was requested. Id. at 480; see also Murphy,
supra note 5, at 363 n.83 (citations omitted) (arguing that based on precedent, the Court
“considers assessment of compensatory damages to be more fundamental to the right to jury
trial than the determination of liability”); Murphy, supra note 142, at 746 (describing jury
fact-finding as not an end in itself, but a means towards achieving just adjudication).
295 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 476–77 (failing to find any general authoritative pre-ratification
decision sustaining the power of an English court to increase the amount of damages fixed
by a jury). To the extent that judicial discretion existed to abridge or supplement a jury’s
verdict, such discretionary authority was rarely exercised. See id. at 480. When an award was
excessive it was usual for a court to suggest a sum to prevent the necessity of a new trial. Id.;
see also Lord Townsend v. Hughes (1677) 86 Eng. Rep. 850, 850 (stating that as a matter
of law the “jury [is] the sole judge[ ] of the damages”).
296 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876); see also Wright & Williams, supra note 29, at 519–32 (arguing
that if that Amendment were incorporated, compensatory damage caps would not survive a
Seventh Amendment challenge).
297 See Strict Scrutiny, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex
/strict_scrutiny [http://perma.cc/BPB3-MLRU].
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jury trial generally receive strict scrutiny.298 Non-fundamental rights like the civil
jury trial receive the less exacting review for reasonableness.299 As strict scrutiny is
not a declaration of fatality, a review for reasonableness is not a commendation.300
Next, this Article hypothesizes that due to the historical similarities between crimi-
nal and civil jury trial rights, the Sixth Amendment’s lessons are applicable in civil
cases. As pointed out by Thomas, criminal and civil juries were inseparable until the
nineteenth century.301 Thus at the time of ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the
English civil jury was in many ways similar to the English criminal jury.302 The fact
that the U.S. Bill of Rights enshrined the civil and criminal jury in separate Amend-
ments does not remove those shared historic common law characteristics.
III. DECONSTRUCTING JURYLESS FACT-FINDING IN CIVIL CASES: LESSONS FROM
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL CLAUSE
The right to a jury—whether it be civil or criminal—derives from the Magna
Carta.303 Thomas Jefferson viewed Anglo-American juries as pillars.304 Associate
Justice Joseph Story, also a revered historical constitutional commentator, affirmed
that juries were among the “great bulwark[s] of [U.S.] civil and political liberties.”305
Story described a Seventh Amendment that placed “upon the high ground of
constitutional right[s] the inestimable privilege of a trial by jury in civil cases, a
privilege scarcely inferior to that in criminal cases, which is conceded by all [per-
sons] to be essential to political and civil liberty.”306 Over time the Court has
allowed the legislature some discretion to modify civil jury trial rights,307 but none
involved a predetermination of damages in a common law–based cause of action.
298 See id.
299 Rational Basis, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational
_basis [http://perma.cc/DP5M-GJWY].
300 See id.
301 See Thomas, supra note 166, at 1207.
302 Id.
303 See, e.g., Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Con-
stitutional Rights to Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 817–28 (2014).
304 Thomas Jefferson, Query XIV: Laws, AN EXPRESSION OF THE AMERICAN MIND 79
(R.B. Bernstein ed., 2013) (“[T]he common sense of twelve honest men gives still a better
chance of just decision, than the hazard of cross and pile.”).
305 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
540–41 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873).
306 1 id. at 633 (footnote omitted).
307 See, e.g., Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1899) (holding that the
legislature could expand the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace where there is a “general
increase in litigation”).
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Thomas hypothesizes that in the common law and in the U.S. colonies, criminal and
civil juries were intended to protect individuals “against the judiciary, the executive,
and the legislature.”308 Thomas also observed that at the time of the founding, “civil
juries decided cases without significant interference.”309 This lack of interference
encompassed findings on damages.310
The role of civil and criminal juries in the U.S. constitutional framework is one
that dates to the founding. Anti-federalists complained that the original U.S. Constitu-
tion did not provide protection for the right to a civil or criminal jury.311 These
concerns may have been largely rooted in protecting debtor defendants.312 Jury trial
advocates pointed to other important and compelling rationales.313 Samuel Bryan,
a founding era anti-federalist judge, pointed out that juries “preserve[d] in the hands
of the people . . . [a] share . . . in the administration of justice.”314 Anti-federalists
also regarded the jury as a protectant against government overreach or favoritism.315
Both the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury and the Seventh Amendment
right to a civil jury were originally intended by the Framers of the U.S. Bill of Rights
to apply only against the federal government.316 However, by 1968 a concurring
opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana317 acknowledged that most of the rights contained
in the Bill were applicable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.318 The Duncan majority established a three prong framework
to determine whether a right was fundamental, and thus incorporated to apply against
the states.319 The first prong asks “whether [the] right is among those ‘fundamental
principles of liberty and justice [that] lie at the base of [U.S.] civil and political
308 Thomas, supra note 166, at 1232.
309 Id. at 1209 (citations omitted).
310 Id. at 1209–11.
311 See Wolfram, supra note 53, at 673–705.
312 Id. (discussing role of debtors in the civil jury clause ratifying conventions).
313 Id. at 705–10.
314 Id. at 695–96 (quoting Letters of Centinel, No. II, Freeman’s J. (Oct. 24, 1787),
reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 584 (John
Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888)). Wolfram posits that one of the reasons
the Framers included a “constitutional guarantee of [a] civil jury trial was . . . to guard
against unwanted legislation passed by a misguided national legislature.” Id. at 664. Wolfram
hypothesizes that the Seventh Amendment brings “to light strongly felt popular beliefs”
about the government and its relationship to the people and “the importance of the civil jury
in preserving that relationship.” Id. at 669.
315 Id. at 670–71.
316 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (discussing earlier Court assertions
“that the right to jury trial is not essential to ordered liberty and may be dispensed with by
the States regardless of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
317 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
318 Id. at 171 (Black, J., concurring).
319 See id. at 148–49 (majority opinion).
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institutions.’”320 The second prong asks “whether [the right] is basic in [the U.S.]
system of jurisprudence.”321 The final prong asks whether the right is “‘fundamental’
and ‘essential’ to a fair trial[.]”322
Duncan ultimately deemed the Sixth Amendment criminal jury a fundamental
and incorporated right.323 This begs the question of whether the civil jury is on equal
footing. Even though all but a few U.S. state constitutions contain a right to a civil
jury,324 no post-incorporation jurisprudence exists on the question of whether the
Seventh Amendment is among those rights that are enforceable against the states.
The most historic case on this issue is Walker v. Sauvinet.325 Walker involved
whether the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments were offended by a statute that
required the trial judge to direct a verdict when the jury could not agree.326 The
Court rejected the incorporation of the federal civil jury trial right and upheld the
judge’s $1000 damage award.327 As a pre-incorporation case decided in 1876,
Walker is not particularly instructive because of the (then) overwhelming hostility
towards the application of the Bill of Rights against the states.328
A modern analysis of the fundamentality of the civil jury trial right may be long
overdue, but this Article does not engage in such an undertaking. Instead this Article
focuses on the historic nature of jury trial rights and the shared common law charac-
teristics between civil and criminal juries. A jury finding on disputed facts consti-
tutes a core common law practice.329 In the common law and in early colonial
practice once the right to a jury attached, certain questions required a jury determi-
nation.330 As demonstrated in Etheridge, Sofie, and Watts, state courts agree with
federal jurisprudence that a civil jury is required for actions that are analogous to
“[s]uits at common law,” as opposed to cases traditionally tried in courts of equity
or admiralty.331 States also agree that in order to determine where a case would have
320 Id. at 148 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
321 Id. at 148–49 (quoting In Re Oliver, 33 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).
322 Id. at 149 (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963)).
323 Id.
324 See, e.g., Tellis v. Lincoln Par. Police Jury, 916 So .2d 1248, 1250 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
(“The right to a civil jury trial is not a constitutionally protected right in Louisiana.”).
325 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
326 Id. at 92.
327 Id. at 92–93.
328 See id. at 92.
329 Lerner, supra note 303, at 844 (citing Bothwell v. Bos. Elevated Ry., 102 N.E. 665,
669 (Mass. 1913)).
330 Id. at 863 (“Courts relied on the old common law maxim . . . that the facts were for the
jury to decide, the law for the judge.”).
331 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987). Tull involved claims for violation
of the Clean Water Act, which prohibited the pollution of navigable waters, including their
adjacent swamps, marshes, bogs and similar other areas. Id. at 414 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311,
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been tried before a jury, one must examine both the nature of the action and the
remedy sought.332 Under this approach, a court must first ask whether the cause of
action is similar to eighteenth-century cases brought in courts of law prior to the
merger of law and equity in the English common law.333 Next a court must ask
whether the requested remedy is “legal or equitable in nature.”334 It is firmly estab-
lished that tort claims were brought in courts of law, not equity.335 Additionally,
federal jurisprudence views the amount of compensatory damages as a fact that
requires a civil jury.336 But as stated, the Seventh Amendment remains unenforce-
able against the states.337 Thus, this Article turns to Sixth Amendment criminal jury
jurisprudence, which provides instruction about the nature and scope of jury trial
rights and the limits of legislative authority to alter those rights.338 The Sixth
1344, 1362(7) (2012); 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(1)–(7), (c) (1986)). The defendant unsuccessfully
demanded a jury. Id. at 415. After a fifteen-day bench trial, the judge concluded that the
defendant violated the Act and ordered injunctive relief. Id. at 415–16. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the denial of a jury. Id. at 416. The Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
between the circuits on the issue of whether the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury trial
guarantee applied “when the United States sues . . . to collect a [statutory civil] penalty . . . .”
Id. at 416–17 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d
414, 422–23 (2d. Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
332 See Tull, 481 U.S. at 417.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 417–18. The Tull Court reasoned that “[a]fter the adoption of the Seventh
Amendment, federal courts . . . treat[ed] the civil penalty suit as a particular type of action
in debt,” which in the common law required a jury. Id. at 418. The Court warned its analysis
was not precise. See id. at 421. The goal was not to engage in an “‘abstruse historical’ search
for the nearest [eighteenth]-century analog.” Id. (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,
538 n.10 (1970)). The relief sought was more important than finding a precise common law
analogy. Id. The Court held that the government’s demand for civil penalties under the Clean
Water Act was clearly analogous to debt actions that could be enforced in a court of law. Id.
at 422–23. But Tull distinguished findings on liability from findings on the amount of the
fine. Id. at 425 (indicating a defendant has a “constitutional right to a jury trial to determine
his liability on the legal claims”). Tull found no right to a jury assessment of the penalty
itself. Id. at 429. On this question the common law offered no resolution. Id. at 426. In the
U.S. legal tradition civil penalties were fixed by Congress. Id. Nor was the assessment of a
civil penalty an essential function for the jury at trial. Id. at 426–27 (describing the assess-
ment of a civil penalty as a “highly discretionary calculation[ ] . . . [that was] traditionally
performed by judges”).
335 Jill Wieber Lens, Punishing for the Injury: Tort Law’s Influence in Defining the Consti-
tutional Limitations on Punitive Damage Awards, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 603 (2016).
336 See Murphy, supra note 142, at 773; Murphy, supra note 5, at 349 n.2 (theorizing that
civil juries were originally given broad discretion to determine general or compensatory
damages but not punitive damages); Whitehouse, supra note 101, at 1262–64.
337 See Murphy, supra note 142, at 724; see also Murphy, supra note 5, at 351 (indicating
the Seventh Amendment has been interpreted as a constraint on Congress).
338 See Wolfram, supra note 53, at 645–46 (discussing history of the Sixth Amendment
Criminal Jury Trial Clause).
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Amendment is of particular importance in light of the state supreme court split on
compensatory damage caps, the significant impact that a cap has on the civil jury’s
award, and ultimately an individual’s right to compensation for an injury.339 Each
lesson is discussed in turn.
A. The Lesson from Apprendi: Modern Procedures Cannot Significantly Alter
Certain Common Law Characteristics of the Jury Trial Right
Apprendi teaches that even though criminal procedure practice changes over
time, modern courts “must at least adhere to . . . basic [common law] prin-
ciples . . . .”340 Apprendi recognized the criminal jury as a right of surpassing
importance in the common law and limited legislative authority to choose between
facts that had to be found by a jury and facts that did not.341 Reflecting on the
common law at the time of the founding, Apprendi acknowledged that the modern
distinction between elements and enhancements was unknown to trial by jury as it
existed in the years surrounding the founding.342 At common law, an “invariable
link[ ]” existed between the crime and the punishment.343 Apprendi ultimately
required a jury to assess those facts that increased punishment.344 The relevant
inquiry was not one of form, but substance and the relevant question was whether
the required finding exposed the defendant to a greater penalty than that authorized
by the plea or the guilty verdict.345
Basic common law principles should also guide the constitutional assessment
of civil jury rights.346 Reliable common law principles can be derived upon a
reflection or an analysis of history.347 Thomas posits that only the common law
limits the procedures that affect civil and criminal jury trial rights,348 and thus
339 See Murphy, supra note 142, at 742–43 (arguing that because the Framers had a uni-
fied vision of jury trial rights, their “textual segregation” of criminal and civil juries was
“more formal than substantive”).
340 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2000) (emphasis added). Justice Thomas,
concurring in the judgment, argued that the Sixth Amendment’s text and structure reflected
the jury’s constitutionally prescribed role as ultimate fact-finder. See id. at 518 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (describing Apprendi as reflecting the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment).
341 Id. at 478 (majority opinion). Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was designated a
historically significant companion to the right to a criminal jury verdict because both reflect
“a profound judgment” about law enforcement and the administration of justice. Id. (quoting
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–62 (1970)).
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 See id. at 491–92.
345 Id. at 494.
346 See Thomas, supra note 67, at 753.
347 See id. at 754.
348 Id. at 751.
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common law procedures are presumptively constitutional.349 Conversely, the common
law need not restrict the development of new procedures as long as those procedures
comport with common law practices.350
Historically, compensatory damages have been “awarded to a person as com-
pensation, indemnity or restitution for harm.”351 Until recently, an enduring principle
was that entitlement to compensatory damages in common law tort cases necessarily
depended on the specific circumstances of an individual case.352 Robinson v. Har-
man,353 an English common law case involving contracts,354 appears to be the first
to articulate the principle of compensatory damages.355 Robinson establishes that
“where a party sustains a loss by reason of breach of contract, he is, so far as money
can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the
contract had been performed.”356 Thus, at its origin compensatory damages were
specifically designed to put a party in the same position before some harm or wrong
occurred. The common law also supports the view that the amount of a compensa-
tory damage award was based on a finding by the jury about “the injury alleged and
proved.”357 When awarded, compensatory damages must be “commensurate with the
injury suffered[.]”358
Historically, compensatory damages have also contained both an economic loss
and a non-economic loss component.359 The economic loss component includes
medical expenses, lost earnings, and other objectively verifiable monetary losses.360
The non-economic loss component includes injuries related to pain, suffering, mental
anguish and other emotional distresses, disfigurement, and the loss of consortium
or capacity to enjoy life.361 As described by Dobbs, compensatory damages compen-
sate the victim for any losses resulting from an injury.362 Both the economic and
non-economic loss components traditionally constituted a legal remedy for which
349 Id.
350 Id. at 757 n.122.
351 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (Am. Law Inst. 1979).
352 See Jill Wieber Lens, Procedural Due Process and Predictable Punitive Damages
Awards, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1, 39 (2012).
353 (1848) 1 Ex. 849.
354 Id.
355 See David Campbell, A Relational Critique of the Third Restatement of Restitution
§ 39, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063, 1097–98 (2011); see also OXFORD PRINCIPLES OF
ENGLISH LAW: ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW 21.17, at 1260 (Andrew Burrows ed., 3d ed. 2013).
356 Campbell, supra note 355, at 1097–98 (quoting Robinson, 1 Ex. at 855).
357 Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 64 (1876).
358 Id.
359 FISCHER, supra note 9, § 6.5, at 36–37.
360 Id. at 36. Some states also imposed caps on punitive damage awards. See id. at 37.
361 Id. at 36–37.
362 DOBBS, supra note 97, § 8.1, at 540 (discussing requirement that personal injury
damages be proved and calculated at the trial).
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a jury was required.363 In short, both presented a question of “historical or predictive
fact”364 that varied with the kind of harm suffered.365 St. Louis, Iron Mountain &
South Railway Co. v. Craft366 signals the Court’s agreement with Dobbs. Craft asked
whether a $5,000 award for pain and suffering in a federal wrongful death action
was excessive.367 On this issue the Court noted that the damages did seem large.368
However the power, duty, and responsibility for determining damages involved
“only a question of fact” for the jury.369
Most state constitutions are not so explicit as to guarantee who determines
damages, but most states agree that the English common law forms the interpretive
basis to when a civil jury “attaches” to a particular cause of action.370 States also 
363 Id. § 1.4, at 3 (distinguishing between remedies at law, which require a jury, and reme-
dies in equity, which do not); see also Murphy, supra note 5, at 349.
364 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2000) (emphasis
added) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
365 DOBBS, supra note 97, § 3.3(2), at 220 (explaining the lack of universal measurement
for damages).
366 237 U.S. 648 (1915).
367 Id. at 653–54. After the decedent was killed in an automobile accident the decedent’s
administrator filed an action under the federal employer’s liability act of 1908, which had
been amended in 1910. Id. at 653. The jury’s award of $11,000 for the deceased’s post-
accident pain and suffering was reduced to $5,000. Id. at 654.
368 Id. at 661.
369 See id. (emphasis added); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 88, at 24 (“from the
beginning of trial by jury” the amount of damages was “a ‘fact’ to be found by the jurors”).
370 See, e.g., One Chevrolet Auto. v. State, 87 So. 592, 592 (Ala. 1921) (preserving the
right to a civil jury does not extend to “causes unknown to the common law”); Frank v.
Golden Valley Election Ass’n, 748 P.2d 752, 754 (Alaska 1988) (citing ALASKA CONST.
Art. I, § 16) (preserving the right to a civil jury to the “same extent as it existed at common
law”); In re Estate of Newman, 196 P.3d 863, 875 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (preserving a right
to a civil jury “only in cases where it would have existed under the common law”); Jones v.
Reed, 590 S.W.2d 6, 13 (Ark. 1979) (extending the right to a civil jury “only to common law
actions”); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Super. Ct., 252 P.3d 450, 452 (Cal. 2011) (limiting right to
a civil jury only “as it existed at common law”); Swanson v. Boschen, 120 A.2d 546, 549
(Conn. 1956) (recognizing right to a civil jury as extended only to actions that were “of the
same nature” as those that existed prior to 1818); Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1296
(Del. 1991) (discussing constitutional commitment to a civil jury only “as it existed at com-
mon law”); In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1986) (holding
Florida constitutional guarantee that right to jury was “the right enjoyed of the time
[Florida’s] first Constitution became effective”); Strange v. Strange, 148 S.E.2d 494, 495
(Ga. 1966) (“[I]n civil actions the right of jury trial exists only in those cases where the right
existed prior to the first Georgia Constitution . . . .”); Hous. Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Ferguson,
979 P.2d 1107, 1114 (Haw. 1999) (referring “to the common law practice” to interpret
Hawaii’s right to a civil jury); Kirkland v. Blaine Co. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1118 (Idaho
2000) (acknowledging that at the time Idaho’s Constitution was adopted, there was a civil
right to a jury award of compensatory damages); Estate of Grabow’s, 392 N.E.2d 980, 982
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(Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (excluding causes of actions unknown to common law from the scope
of the civil jury trial right); Sims v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 782 N.E.2d 345, 352 (Ind. 2003)
(finding prohibition against trial by civil jury reasonable where cause of action was not
recognized by the common law); Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 305 N.W.2d 724, 727
(Iowa 1981) (noting the constitutional right to a civil jury carries with it common-law
concepts); Waggener v. Seever Sys., Inc., 664 P.2d 813, 817 (Kan. 1983) (noting the ques-
tion of whether the right to a civil jury applies is determinable on the basis of the common
law); Daniels v. CDB Bell, LLC, 300 S.W.3d 204, 210 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) (noting
Kentucky law recognizes the exception for the civil right to a jury for “causes at common
law that would have been regarded as arising in equity rather than law”); State v. Anton, 463
A.2d 703, 709 (Me. 1983) (the right to jury trial at common law “guarantees the right
today”); Davis v. Slater, 861 A.2d 78, 86–87 (Md. 2004) (“[t]he common law . . . includes
the law governing the entitlement to demand” a civil jury); Stonehill Coll. v. Mass. Comm’n
Against Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205, 214 (Mass. 2004) (referring to the common law
right to a civil jury); State Conservation Dep’t v. Brown, 55 N.W.2d 859, 861 (Mich. 1952)
(the right to civil jury at common law “may not be defeated”); Onvoy, Inc. v. Allete, Inc.,
736 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Minn. 2007) (holding Minnesota’s right to a civil jury trial “meant to
protect the right . . . as it existed” when the Minnesota Constitution was adopted); Talbot &
Higgins Lumber Co. v. McLeod Lumber Co., 113 So. 433, 434 (Miss. 1927) (describing the
right to a civil jury as deriving from the common law); State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95
S.W.3d 82, 86 (Mo. 2003) (same); In re M.H., 143 P.3d 103, 106 (Mont. 2006) (rejecting
applicability of the civil jury trial right because the right did not exist for such proceedings
at common law); State ex rel. Cherry v. Burns, 602 N.W.2d 477, 482 (Neb. 1999)
(preserving the right to a civil jury as it existed in the common law); Cheung v. Dist. Ct., 124
P.3d 550, 557 (Nev. 2005) (noting that the Nevada Constitution was written to be interpreted
with the common law in mind); Hair Excitement, Inc. v. L’Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 965 A.2d
1032, 1037 (N.H. 2009) (noting that to determine if there was a civil right to a jury, one must
look to whether it was a customary practice at common law); Jersey Cent. Power & Light
Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 59 A.3d 561, 568 (N.J. 2013) (holding the New Jersey Constitution
guarantees the right to a civil jury trial only when the right existed at common law); Bd. of
Ed. of Carlsbad Schs. v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511, 522 (N.M. 1994) (in the common law, the
right to a civil jury determined whether a cause of action existed in a court of law or a court
of equity); Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 527 N.Y.S. 2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)
(describing the common law as the underlying determinant of whether the right to a civil jury
applied); N.C. State Bar v. DuMont, 286 S.E.2d 89, 93 (N.C. 1982) (noting constitutional
right to civil jury where the right existed at common law); State v. $17,515.00 in Cash
Money, 670 N.W.2d 826, 827 (N.D. 2003) (stating civil jury required where demand could
be made as a matter of right at common law); Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., LLC,
927 N.E.2d 1092, 1105 (Ohio 2010) (noting right to try civil jury trial applies only if right
attached at common law); State ex rel. Dugger v. Twelve Thousand Dollars, 155 P.3d 858,
864 (Okla. Cir. App. 2007) (right to a civil jury guaranteed if such right existed at common
law); Jensen v. Whitlow, 51 P.3d 599, 604 (Or. 2002) (Oregon Constitution guarantees a jury
in civil trials if a jury was required); Commonwealth v. One (1) 1984 Z-28 Camaro Coupe,
610 A.2d 36, 49 (Pa. 1992) (referring to the common law to determine the scope of the right
to a civil jury); Bendick v. Cambio, 558 A.2d 941, 945 (R.I. 1989) (noting right available if
existed at common law); C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm., 230 S.E.2d
223, 226 (S.C. 1976) (referring to the common law to determine the scope of the right to a
civil jury); State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 783, 805 (S.D. 2006) (extending scope of civil jury
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agree that “damages must be assessed by the jury” if the cause of action was analo-
gous to a common law case that existed at the time of ratification of the state or
federal constitution.371 At the time the Seventh Amendment was ratified in 1791, the
parties in common law cases were entitled to have a jury determine liability and
damages—both of which were questions of fact.372 In other words, the parties were
entitled to a jury determination on “the question of liability and the extent of the
injury by an assessment of damages.”373 Additionally, common law courts lacked
authority to increase or decrease damages in an action for personal injury.374
Langbein has observed that awarding money damages was a major distinguishing
feature between English common law courts and English courts of equity.375 The Court
has recognized this distinction and has deemed damages an issue of fact, not law.
trial right only to causes of action that existed at common law); Helms v. Tenn. Dept. of
Safety, 987 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tenn. 1999) (noting Tennessee Constitution guaranteed civil
jury trial as it existed at common law); State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d
288, 291 (Tex. 1975) (right to civil jury trial exists in “all actions where that right existed”
in common law); Buck v. Robinson, 177 P.3d 648, 653 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (noting only
actions that required a civil jury at common law require a jury today); State v. Irving Oil
Corp., 955 A.2d 1098, 1101 (Vt. 2008) (right to civil jury trial guaranteed if existed at
common law); Ingram v. Commonwealth, 741 S.E.2d 62, 68 (Va. Ct. App. 2013) (denying
civil jury because cause of action unknown to common law); Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568,
579 (Wash. 1973) (en banc) (referring to the common law to determine the scope of the right
to a civil jury); State by State Road Comm’n v. Boggess, 126 S.E.2d 26, 29 (W. Va. 1962)
(noting right to civil jury trial preserved in cases that existed at common law); State v. Abbot
Labs., 816 N.W.2d 145, 156 (Wis. 2012) (first question to determine if right to a civil jury
trial exists today is if existed at common law); In re Estate of Cheek, 53 P.3d 113, 116 (Wyo.
2002) (denying civil jury because not given in common law); see also Whitehouse, supra
note 101, at 1251 (commenting on the Founders’ differing view that the number and differing
forms of civil jury trial clauses either made inclusion of any one impractical for federal
constitutional law purposes; no risk imposed because the popularity of the clause made
objection to it odious to the extent of being hated). But see Motz v. Jammaron, 676 P.2d
1211, 1213 (Colo. App. 1983) (no entitlement to a civil jury as a matter of right); Tellis v.
Lincoln Par. Police Jury, 916 So.2d 1248, 1250 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (because state constitution
does not guarantee a right to a civil jury, the applicability of the right must be determined by
looking to state statutory law).
371 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 478 (1935). Dimick involved personal injuries
allegedly caused by the negligent operation of an automobile on a public highway. Id. at 475.
The plaintiff argued the jury’s $500 verdict was inadequate and requested a new trial, which
was denied immediately after the defendant consented to a $1,000 increase in damages. Id.
at 475–76. The Court held that conditioning the denial of a new trial on defendant’s
agreement to an increase of the damages violated the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 487–88.
372 See id. at 486.
373 Id.; see also id. at 490 (Stone, J., dissenting); Murphy, supra note 142, at 746; Murphy,
supra note 5, at 363 n.83.
374 See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 476–77; see also Lord Townsend v. Hughes (1677) 86 Eng.
Rep. 994.
375 Langbein, supra note 89, at 538–39.
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Thomas observed that the common law did not appear to empower state legislatures
with authority to “check” the civil jury376 or otherwise “curb damages”377 that were
otherwise properly awarded. Watts held that legislatively imposed caps neither
existed in nor were contemplated by the common law when most colonial constitu-
tions were enacted.378 Thomas argues that legislatively imposed caps impermissibly
shifted the issue of damages to the legislature,379 at least where the jury’s damage
award exceeded the legislatively imposed cap.380 In short, such procedures appear
to take the jury “out of the damages determination.”381
Compensatory damage caps infringe on the civil jury trial right in the same way
that Apprendi recognized that some structured sentencing guidelines infringed on
the criminal jury trial right.382 Both the damage award in a cap regime and the sentence
in certain guidelines regimes were the result of juryless fact-finding. Additionally,
caps constitute a “one-size-fits-all” approach that lacks individuality or flexibility.
Caps also fail to take into account the actual harm suffered or the amount of damage
in an individual case,383 which has been the longstanding method for calculating
compensation in common law–based civil cases. Once a cap is applied, the jury trial
right as it was enshrined in the common law has been significantly altered.384 Caps
also result in a procedure where compensatory damage awards are no longer closely
aligned with their traditional purpose: compensation for actual losses or injuries.385
B. The Lesson from Blakely and Booker: Mandatory Removal of the Jury as the
Primary Fact-Finder Was Not Authorized in Common Law Cases
The essential lesson of Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Booker is that
mandatory removal of the criminal jury as the primary fact-finder on material issues
376 See Thomas, supra note 166, at 1229.
377 Id. (questioning whether such role existed for common law legislatures).
378 See Watts v. Cox Med. Ctr., 376 S.W.3d 633, 641 (Mo. 2012); see also Murphy, supra
note 5, at 399.
379 See Thomas, supra note 166, at 1236.
380 Id.
381 Id. at 1237.
382 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“[A]ny fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury . . . .”).
383 See Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1124 (arguing that caps are a departure from common
law concepts that each case is unique and that each case should be individually accessed).
384 See Murphy, supra note 142, at 734 (noting that because jurors bring collective com-
mon sense, experiences, and training, juries are more capable of making “rational decision[s]
about the facts” of a case). Murphy hypothesizes on the jury’s role as protectant against
government abuse when “the government seeks to contort the applicable standard.” Id. at
735 (emphasis added).
385 See Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1122 (arguing caps impair the deterrent effect of
the tort system).
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was not authorized in the common law. Blakely described the jury as more than a
“mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in [the U.S.]
constitutional structure.”386 Booker confirmed a jury determination of disputed facts
as a firmly rooted and constitutionally protected precept of the common law.387
Booker acknowledged that the greater significance designated to some facts and the
mandatory removal of the jury on those facts raised compelling questions as to how
the right to a criminal jury could be meaningfully preserved.388 The Court was com-
pelled to answer this question not as a matter of Sixth Amendment formalism, but
a matter of Sixth Amendment substance.389
The civil jury right, like its criminal counterpart, continues to be held in “jealous
regard” by the American people.390 In the United States, the jury always has been and
still is regarded as “the normal and preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in
civil cases.”391 Colonial practice reflected the common law reverence for the jury as
an “indispensable element” of judicial administration.392 Professor Charles Wolfram,
a distinguished scholar on the constitutional history of the Seventh Amendment,
described the U.S. civil jury as a “familiar and well-ensconced feature of pre-1787
political life.”393 Wolfram notes that the continuity of the civil jury by the thirteen
U.S. colonies after the outbreak of hostilities with England394 was either “by express
provision in [ ] state constitution[s], by statute, or by continuation of the practices
that had applied prior to the break with England.”395 According to Wolfram, “only
juries could determine damages” in ratification era English courts.396 Mandatory caps
against compensatory damage awards neither existed nor were contemplated by the
common law before or after the time when most state constitutions were enacted.397
386 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
387 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230 (2005).
388 Id. at 237.
389 Id.
390 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 478 (1935); see also Thomas, supra note 166, at
1232 (“The English viewed the jury as a protector against the judiciary, the executive, and
the legislature. The American jury was established largely according to this model . . . .”).
391 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486; see also Whitehouse, supra note 101, at 1244 (describing the
historical understanding of the civil jury as “an institutional check” upon government).
392 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 478; see also Thomas, supra note 166, at 1198 (recognizing that
before the constitutional convention, all of the colonial states with written constitutions had
a right to a jury trial); Whitehouse, supra note 101, at 1243–44 (describing U.S. jury as a
pedigreed, historical, and structural element of American government); Wolfram, supra note
53, at 653–56 (discussing civil jury trial practice in U.S. colonies).
393 Wolfram, supra note 53, at 653.
394 Id. at 654.
395 Id. at 655 (citation omitted).
396 Thomas, supra note 67, at 781.
397 See Watts v. Cox Med. Ctr., 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (2012); see also Murphy, supra note
5, at 399 (finding a “strong historical link between assessment of compensatory damages and
the right to jury trial”).
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In the common law the power of the judge and the power of the jury were dis-
tinguished by findings on the law, which were determined by the former, and findings
of fact, which were determined by the latter.398 But, the common law did not permit
“inadequate or excessive” civil jury awards to stand.399 Rather “where the verdict
was excessive or trifling, the remedy was to submit the case to . . . another jury.”400
Authority to increase or decrease damages did exist in the common law,401 but little
evidence suggests that courts often acted upon or exercised that authority.402 Thomas
observed that new trials were generally ordered where damages were “so high as to
indicate prejudice or partiality of the jury.”403 Thomas also discerned that where
authority to reduce damages was exercised in U.S. colonial courts, such authority
was confined to those courts sitting en banc.404 Most importantly Thomas found that
immediately before adoption of the Seventh Amendment in 1791, “there [was] no
sustainable evidence” that new trials for excessive damages were granted in cases
arising in tort.405 U.S. colonial courts “adhered to the English common law rule
regarding new trials for excessive damages.”406 In tort cases, where damages were
uncertain, the jury was given particular latitude: the movant for a new trial was required
to show that damages were not only excessive, but outrageous.407 Thomas clarified
398 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
399 Id. Dimick described a right to a jury that acts properly. Id. Thus, where the verdict is “pal-
pably and grossly inadequate or excessive, . . . both parties remain entitled, as they were entitled
in the first instance, to have a jury properly determine the question[s] of liability and . . . dam-
ages.” Id.; see also Murphy, supra note 142, at 776 (describing a new trial as the cure for
jury error).
400 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 478. In cases where the plaintiff asks for a new trial because
damages are too small, the court lacks authority to order an increase without consent. Id. at
480. In turn, where the defendant asks for a new trial because damages were excessive, “the
[c]ourt has no power to reduce the damages to a reasonable sum instead of ordering a new
trial.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Baldus et al., supra note 10, at
1127–30 (discussing additur and remittitur); Thomas, supra note 166, at 1201–11 (observing
common law and colonial U.S. practices that allowed a judge to order a new trial where
damages were excessive).
401 See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 477; see also id. at 481 (requiring assent of both parties before
authorizing interference from the court).
402 See id. at 477. Dimick found that 1733 was the last known exercise of such authority
in the English common law. Id. (citing Burton v. Baynes, Barnes Practice Cases 153 (1733)).
403 Thomas, supra note 67, at 775 (discussing the ability of eighteenth-century English
common law judges to order a reduction of damages).
404 See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 477. This practice was obsolete in England at the time the
Seventh Amendment was ratified. Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 67, at 781; Suja A.
Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 744 (2004).
405 Thomas, supra note 67, at 776–77; see also id. at 778 (describing “immeasurability of
tort damages”).
406 Id. at 782–83.
407 Id. at 777 (citing Sharpe v. Brice (1774) Eng. Rep. 557, 557; Beardmore v. Carrington
288 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:235
that on motions for new trials for excessive damages, English common law courts em-
phasized the jury’s fact-finding role as the “proper determiner of the damages.”408
State and federal courts should adhere to common law traditions when interpret-
ing the nature and scope of the right to a civil jury. There is no cause to assume jury
trial procedures lack sufficient safeguards, of which there are many.409 The trial
court and the parties engage in inquiries on whether each individual juror is impar-
tial and unbiased.410 The jury engages in a process of “collective deliberation [of]
the evidence and the arguments of [the parties].”411 To prevent jury bias, the trial
judge also acts as gatekeeper by determining the admissibility of evidence. Along
with the jury, the trial judge assesses the testimony; but the trial judge can also re-
assess the jury’s findings on liability and damages.412 An appellate court has author-
ity to affirm or overturn the entire process if an error has occurred.413 Compensatory
damage caps displace this process. Instead of recognizing and enforcing the jury’s
determination, a fixed legislative determination uniformly applies regardless of the
sufficiency of the evidence presented to the jury. Fixed damages are not based on an
assessment or consideration of the facts in an individual case. Nor can the applica-
tion of the cap be overturned by an appellate court.
Procedures that infringe on the civil jury trial right should at a minimum meet
the due process standard of reasonableness. While under this standard state legisla-
tive decisions are afforded deference, legislative action that is clearly erroneous
should not be followed.414 One key inquiry on the issue of reasonableness is level of
inclusiveness. On this inquiry compensatory damage caps fail. An irrebuttable
presumption of excessiveness applies to all awards over the cap.415 All awards under the
cap are presumed reasonable.416 Targets of the cap are not chosen because they failed
to provide sufficient evidence of damages,417 but because the tortfeasor caused more
actual damages (at least according to the jury).418 Caps apply with no consideration
(1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792 (noting the 1764 King’s Bench proclamation that “there had
never been a new trial granted for excessive damages in [ ] tort”)).
408 Id. at 779; see id. at 780 (quoting Leeman v. Allen (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 742, 743) (de-
scribing the common law judge’s role on a motion for a new trial for excessive damages as
deciding whether “the damages are beyond all measure unreasonable” and noting that “[the
court] cannot say exactly what damages ought to be given”).
409 See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 456–57.
410 Id.
411 Id. at 456–57.
412 See id. (noting trial judge’s review of a jury award).
413 Id. at 457.
414 Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 906 (Fla. 2014) (plurality opinion).
415 See Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1121.
416 See id.
417 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 365 (noting that because caps apply regardless of the
evidence, the legislature has “second-guess[ed]” the jury).
418 See id. at 351 (stating that the real purpose of caps—the limitation of jury decisions—is
in tension with the right to a civil jury).
2016] DECONSTRUCTING JURYLESS FACT-FINDING IN CIVIL CASES 289
of the nature of the injury; the degree or length of pain, suffering, disfigurement, or
mental anguish experienced by the injured party; or the injured party’s age or other
personal characteristics that directly relate to the length or amount of harm. Except
in Massachusetts,419 there is no consideration of whether application of the cap is
just or fair to the plaintiff. Thus, where a party successfully proves that damages
exceed the cap, in all cap regimes but one the compensatory damage award will not
redress actual or concrete losses.420
As applied in a common law–based civil cases, compensatory damage caps alter
the historic right to the civil jury’s judgment on damages. “The ability of the jury
to tailor its decision to the facts and circumstances of a particular case . . . is not a
vice, but a virtue.”421 Yet in all jurisdictions save Massachusetts, the cap’s applica-
tion is automatic and mechanic. Professor Renee Lettow Lerner has explained why
juries were designed to protect against “arbitrary or capricious interference of the
government.”422 Mandatory caps interfere with the civil jury’s constitutionally
proscribed role to “find” the amount of damages. Dobbs describes caps as a “crude
means of controlling” excessiveness.423 This Article agrees, for in cap regimes, some
categories of provable injuries are left undercompensated. Less tortious defendants
will pay the full value of the injuries they inflict, while more tortious defendants will
not.424 Surely the criminal justice system would suffer if misdemeanants and violent
felons were punished the same. A civil justice system that awards compensation
without regards to the severity of the harm similarly suffers.425
Mandatory juryless fact-finding drastically alters the balance of power between
the parties in civil litigation. Tortious defendants can propose settlement offers that
419 Sanders, supra note 1, at 39 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 231, § 60H (2015) (allow-
ing jury to consider fairness of cap)).
420 See Yeazell, supra note 5, at 1784 (positing that the unspoken target of tort reform was
the right to a civil jury); see also Thomas, supra note 166, at 1235–37 (discussing legislative
shifts of power that have removed “the jury completely out of the damages determination”).
421 Jeffrey R. White, State Farm and Punitive Damages: Call the Jury Back, 5 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 79, 89 (2005).
422 Lerner, supra note 303, at 833 (quoting Lewis v. Garrett’s Adm’rs, 6 Miss. (5 Howard)
434, 454 (1841)).
423 See generally DOBBS, supra note 97, § 8.1(4), at 658, § 8.8, at 683–89 (discussing
statutory caps on damages).
424 Lens, supra note 352, at 632 (arguing against consistency in tort law compensatory
damage awards and hypothesizing that “some plaintiffs will not receive full compensation
for their injuries” if jury fact-finding on compensatory damages “is replaced with some
objective measure”); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 506 (2008)
(noting that it is “difficult to settle upon a particular figure” that is always appropriate).
425 See Lens, supra note 352, at 623–26; Barry Meier & Hilary Stout, Victims of G.M. Deadly
Defect Fall Through Legal Cracks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/12/30/business/victims-of-gm-deadly-defect-fall-through-legal-cracks.html (reporting
negative effects of caps with regards to revealing product defects and reporting that victims who
are unable to self-finance their cases often have difficulty finding legal representation).
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severely undervalue the provable injury. But if a case proceeds to trial, a plaintiff is
still required to present credible evidence of the full amount of liability, even though
the judgment could ultimately constitute a fraction of the damages that were proven.
Mandatory caps impose identical compensation for dissimilar injuries and constitute
an unprecedented abandonment of common law principles. If such procedures are
properly applied to common law torts, what prevents their application to common
law cases arising in contracts and property?
Blakely and Booker recognized the jury as the “black box” of the U.S. civil and
criminal justice systems.426 The Framers of the U.S. Constitution sought independ-
ence in part due to the Crown’s deprivation of the “benefits of Trial by Jury.”427 One
benefit (or burden) of the jury is judgment as that body sees fit if that judgment is
supported by the evidence. Historically, compensatory damages have been specifi-
cally designed to put a party in the same position before some harm or wrong
occurred.428 By necessity, this requires consideration of the specific circumstances
of the individual case,429 which capped compensation schemes fail to do.430 Addi-
tionally, caps “deprive[ ] [a] jur[y] of proper legal guidance.”431 Such procedures
should be avoided.
C. The Lesson from Alleyne: A Common Law Jury’s Factual Determinations
Were Fully Enforceable Unless Exceptional Circumstances Were Presented
Alleyne v. United States teaches that a common law criminal jury’s factual deter-
minations were fully enforceable unless exceptional circumstances were presented.
Alleyne’s premise was the “clear” relationship at common law between crime and
punishment.432 Alleyne rejected the distinction between facts that increase the
maximum and minimum punishment, at least with regards to whether and when a
jury was required.433 Alleyne described mandatory juryless fact-finding at sentencing
hearings as a post-founding development that conflicted with the historical nature and
scope of the jury trial right.434 Alleyne enshrined Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker as
protectants of the jury and its role as an intermediary between the state and a
criminal defendant.435 Reflecting on common law and early American principles,
426 White, supra note 421, at 136.
427 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
428 Lens, supra note 352, at 39.
429 Id.
430 See Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1122 (pointing out how caps are unrelated to the
level of harm suffered).
431 Phillip Morris USA, v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355 (2002); see also supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
432 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013).
433 Id. at 2155.
434 See id.
435 Id. at 2165.
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Alleyne found a “well-established practice of . . . submitting to the jury[ ] every fact
that [served as] a basis for [the imposition of] or [an increase] in punishment.”436
In the common law a civil jury’s compensatory damage award was also “entitled
to a strong presumption of validity”437 unless exceptional circumstances were pre-
sented.438 The “exceptional circumstance” that justifies the vast majority of compen-
satory damage caps was a medical malpractice crisis that was caused by “excessive”
civil jury awards.439 The Court addressed claims of systematic excessiveness with re-
gards to civil jury verdicts in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker440 and found that overall
civil jury damage awards demonstrated restraint.441 Moreover, in most states the factual
underpinnings justifying the amount of a compensatory damage cap are cloaked in mys-
tery. Recently, a plurality of the Florida Supreme Court in Estate of McCall v. United
States442 specifically noted the lack of legislative findings to support Florida’s com-
pensatory damage cap.443 McCall refused to accept legislative findings “at face
436 Id. at 2159; see also id. at 2160 (noting that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
applied to such facts).
437 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993) (plurality opinion).
438 See id. at 458 (noting that an award significantly larger than those in similar circum-
stances might be one of many considerations upon review).
439 But see Thomas, supra note 166, at 1229 (discussing the lack of clarity on whether in
the English common law legislatures had “a role to check or curb damages”).
440 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
441 See id. at 497–98 (finding no evidence of “mass-produced runaway awards” and noting
the lack of data over the past several decades to substantiate claims of a “marked increase in
the percentage of cases with punitive awards”); see also Hensler, supra note 7, at 493 (find-
ing that outcomes in personal injury torts had not changed much in twenty-five years).
442 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014) (plurality opinion). McCall was decided on equal protection
grounds and only as the cap applied to wrongful death cases. Id. at 915. McCall arose out of pre-
natal and delivery care at a United States Air Force clinic’s family practice department. Id.
at 897. McCall suffered from preeclampsia and labor should have been immediately induced.
Id. No obstetrician was available. Id. at 897–98. Family practice doctors transferred McCall to
another facility and attempted to induce labor. Id. at 898. An obstetrician arrived several hours
after McCall gave birth and delivered the placenta, something the family practice doctors were
unable to do. Id. Unfortunately, the obstetrician who delivered the placenta was not aware that
McCall’s blood pressure dropped to a dangerously low level. Id. For an unknown length of time
after delivering the placenta, McCall lay in shock. Id. at 899. She would ultimately go into car-
diac arrest and was removed from life support after four days. Id. She never regained conscious-
ness. Id. The jury’s non-economic damage award of $2 million was reduced to $1 million. Id.
443 Id. at 914. On certification from the Eleventh Circuit, the McCall plurality considered
whether section 766.118 of the Florida Statutes violated the right to equal protection con-
tained in article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 897. On this question the
plurality answered in the affirmative. Id. Another certified question involved whether section
766.118 violated the civil jury trial right contained in article I, section 22 of the Florida
Constitution, which became effective in 1845, id., after both the Virginia and Missouri Con-
stitutions, but before the Washington and Idaho Constitutions. McCall acknowledged that
at common law, Florida did not recognize a cause of action for wrongful death and thus the
civil jury trial right did not apply to those claims. Id. at 915.
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value.”444 The plurality noted that Florida’s legislative record contained only anecdotal
or inaccurate evidence of physician departures.445 In fact, the number of doctors
licensed to practice in Florida increased in the five years prior to enactment of the
cap.446 Nor was there credible evidence that patients in Florida were denied or had
been directed someplace else for medical care.447 Nor were there large increases in
frivolous lawsuits.448 Essentially, Florida’s malpractice crisis was nothing more than
an “underwriting cycle,”449 which had always occurred in the medical insurance
industry.450 As a result, Florida’s cap lacked a reasonable relationship to addressing
the effects of a medical malpractice crisis.451
At common law, a jury’s award of compensatory damages was designed to put a
party in the same position as before the wrong occurred. By necessity, this requires con-
sideration of the specific circumstances of the individual case.452 Capped compensation
444 Id. at 906. Legislative findings are presumptively correct, though subject to judicial
inquiry as to accuracy. Id.; see Murphy, supra note 142, at 728–29 (identifying the jury trial
right as a protectant against “abuses of official power” and describing the jury as a “one-time
actor” independent from government influences or the judicial system).
445 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 909. No credible evidence correlated high malpractice premiums
with any specific physician’s departure. Id.
446 Id. at 906. From 1991 to 2001, Florida’s physician supply per 100,000 people grew 19
percent in non-metropolitan areas and 10.7 percent in metropolitan areas. Id.
447 Id. at 908 (noting that emergency rooms were not closing as a result of malpractice).
448 Id. at 908. Over a fourteen-year period in Florida, only 7.5 percent of “cases [that]
resulted in payments of $1 million or more . . . involved a jury trial verdict.” Id. at 907 (citing
Neil Vidmar et al., Million Dollar Medical Malpractice Cases in Florida: Post-Verdict and
Pre-Suit Settlements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1345–46 (2006)). Legal action was not re-
quired in 10.1 percent of cases where damages exceeded $1 million. Id. 
449 Id. at 907–08 (finding a lack of credible evidence on whether tort reform flattened
insurance rates, which suggests a medical malpractice crisis may not have existed); see also
id. at 908 (identifying cause of flattening rates as “modulations in the insurance cycle”)
(citations omitted); id. at 910 (“$500,000 cap [against] noneconomic damages would achieve
‘virtually nothing’ with regard[s] to stabilizing medical malpractice insurance rates”) (quoting
Testimony of Robert White, Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting, July 14, 2003, at 48, 50–51).
450 Id. at 908 (finding cause of the two most recent medical liability insurance crises to be
“dramatic increases in the amount of money that the insurance industry put in reserve for
claims” after years of leaving claims under-reserved) (quoting TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE MYTH 53–54 (2005)).
451 Id. at 901. Florida’s cap imposed a “devastating cost[ ] on a few for the purpose of
‘saving a modest amount for many.’” Id. at 903. Florida’s cap burdened “those who [were]
most grievously injured” and “those who sustain[ed] the greatest damage and loss.” Id.; see
also Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1122 (arguing that caps “cannot be morally justified”);
Murphy, supra note 142, at 728 (describing rationality as one of the ultimate goals of just
adjudication); Whitehouse, supra note 101, at 1271 (“When you are alone . . . the hard square
corners of the jury box stand firm against the tide of influence and money.”); Yeazell, supra
note 5, at 1789 (“No one who has studied health care believes that malpractice litigation
makes a major contribution to health costs . . . .”).
452 Lens, supra note 352, at 39–40.
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schemes are not triggered jury error. Empirical evidence on the correlation between
caps and medical malpractice premiums is difficult to reconcile.453 According to one
study, the median insurance premium paid by physicians practicing in high-risk
specialties (internal medicine, obstetrics/gynecology, and general surgery) rose by 48.2
percent in states with non-economic damage caps.454 This compared to a 35.9 percent
rise in states without caps.455 “Only 10.5 percent [of states] experienced static or
declining medical malpractice premium rates following the imposition of [a] cap[ ].”456
States without caps experienced 18.7 percent static or declining medical malpractice
premium rates.457 In Florida, like in most states, insurance companies were not re-
quired to pass the savings attributed from the cap onto providers.458 Instead those
savings constituted a windfall.459 The McCall plurality noted that insurers continued
to request rate increases despite “more than [a] 4,300 percent” surge in net income
following imposition of the cap.460
Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, and Alleyne mandate a return to common law prin-
ciples, which encourage individuality and flexibility. Compensatory damage caps
are unlike anything recognizable in the common law.461 In the same way that guide-
lines sentencing ignored the clear relationship at common law (and in the U.S. legal
tradition) between crime and punishment, caps ignore the clear relationship between
the severity of harm and the amount of an award.462 As a method of reform against
“excessive” verdicts, caps utterly fail. This Article suggests that instead of a cap that
453 See Wright & Williams, supra note 29, at 463 (noting a dispute between insurers and
legislators about the correlation between caps and the medical malpractice). But see Joanna
M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and
Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 925 (2008) (cap states experienced a six to eight
percent lower growth in premiums).
454 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 910.
455 Id.; see also Wright & Williams, supra note 29, at 463. But see Shepherd, supra note
453, at 925.
456 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 910; see also Wright & Williams, supra note 29, at 463 (noting
that of nine states with flat or declining rates, only two had caps).
457 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 910.
458 Id. at 911; see also Wright & Williams, supra note 29, at 464.
459 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 911.
460 Id. at 914. The McCall plurality reasoned that a medical malpractice crisis was not a
permanent condition that justified the perpetual application of a damage cap. Id. at 914–15
(health care policy cannot be supported when an improper burden is placed “upon the
shoulders of the persons and families who have been most severely injured and died as a
result of medical negligence”).
461 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 349 (noting that generally, the legislature may not inter-
fere with an essential function of jury trial); see also Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1122
(arguing that caps cannot be morally justified); Whitehouse, supra note 101, at 1271 (“When
you are alone . . . the hard square corners of the jury box stand firm against the tide of
influence and money.”).
462 See Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1122 (“[Caps] offer no relief at all to plaintiffs
whose damage awards are unreasonably low, given the nature of their injuries.”).
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applies in all cases, trial judges should be re-empowered to determine whether a
jury’s award of compensation is excessive. Where cap regimes empower trial judges
with such authority, the following factors should be considered to determine whether
a civil jury’s compensatory damage award is excessive:
1. The severity of the harm;
2. The length of time during which the injury will exist; and
3. The disparity between the awards of economic and noneconomic
damages.
In analyzing the severity and length of the injury, trial courts should also
consider the following subfactors:
a. The degree of physical and emotional harm caused by the injury;
b. Whether the harm will likely increase or decrease over time;
c. Whether the harm caused the plaintiff to become physically or finan-
cially vulnerable;
d. Whether the harm caused the plaintiff to exist in a vegetative state; and
e. Whether the harm caused permanent disability, disfigurement, blindness,
loss of a limb, paralysis, and cognitive disabilities or other trauma.
These factors are intended as a starting point. Courts should be free to consider other
factors that focus on individualized necessity.463
CONCLUSION
In many states, some compensatory damages awarded in common law–based
civil cases are determined by a mandatory imposition of juryless fact-finding that
deliberately undercompensates an injured party’s catastrophic injury. Such proce-
dures did not exist in the English common law or in the U.S. colonial era. Mandatory
juryless fact-finding in the form of a compensatory damage cap results in recovery
that is arbitrary and sometimes trivial. Compensatory damage caps only prevent
awards that exceed a certain amount despite the evidence to support the jury’s
higher award. This Article suggests that Sixth Amendment jurisprudence rejecting
mandatory juryless fact-finding in criminal cases is of particular importance to man-
datory juryless fact-finding in civil cases. Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, and Alleyne
teach that common law procedures are flexible, but modern courts must still adhere
to basic principles. Mandatory removal of the jury on issues of fact was not authorized
463 Sanders, supra note 1, at 86–87; see Baldus et al., supra note 10, at 1122–23 (noting
the retributive and deterrent purposes of punitive damages); Murphy, supra note 142, at
734–35 (discussing how the jury is better positioned to find adjudicative facts).
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in the common law, and a jury’s verdict is entitled to full respect and enforcement
unless exceptional circumstances exist. A capped award constitutes legislative fact-
finding in violation of the right to a civil jury. Such procedures should be replaced
with those that comply with common law principles, which advance the states’ dual
interests to protect both parties in civil litigation against unreasonably high and low
civil damage awards.
